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The 1994 revision of the venerable Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)
and the development and rapid spread of new unincorporated business
forms, including the limited liability company (LLC) and the limited
liability partnership (LLP) have not only raised many new issues, but have
also breathed new life into old ones. One of the most important of the
latter is the extent to which fiduciary duties may be waived or modified by
contract. Both the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)1 and the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA)2 make unenforceable
some contractual waivers of fiduciary duties. Although there has been
some criticism of such restrictions on waivers, 3 most commentators have
defended restrictions on fiduciary waivers in partnerships and LLCs that are
1. REViSEDUNW. PARTNEmSHIPACT (1994) (RUPA) § 103(b), 6 U.L.A. 16 (1995).
2. UNIF. LiMrrED LiABILrTry COMPANY ACT (ULLCA) § 103(b), 6A U.L.A. 434

(1995).
3. See generally J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into
Freedom of Contract,58 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 29 (Spring 1995); Larry E. Ribstein,
A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REv. 311 (1995);

Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49
BUS. LAW. 45 (1993) [hereinafter Ribstein, Prime Time].
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at least as extensive as those in the uniform laws. 4 This commentary
carries forward the long-standing debate between those who have argued
that fiduciary duties are and should be essentially contractual in nature5 and
those who argue for some restrictions on waiving these duties.'
This issue is worth revisiting despite the substantial amount of ink that
has been spilled over it. First, the debate so far has focused on publicly

held corporations, where the commentators were able to make the argument, albeit a questionable one,7 that the duties did not really arise out of
contract at all. In a closely held firm, which is very much like any long4. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good
Faith,FiduciaryDuty & PermittedHarm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 955 (1995) [hereinafter
Dickerson, Looking Glass]; Claire Moore Dickerson, Is it Appropriate to Appropriate
Corporate Concepts: FiduciaryDuties and the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 111 (1993); Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A
Response to ProfessorHynes, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (Spring 1995) [hereinafter
Vestal, Response]; Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental ContractarianError in the Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993) [hereinafter Vestal, Error];
Allan W. Vestal, The DisclosureObligationsof PartnersInter Se Under the Revised Uniform
PartnershipAct of 1994: Is the ContractarianRevolution Failing?, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1559 (1995) [hereinafter Vestal, Revolution]; Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary
Duty: The Texture of Relationship, 58 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Spring 1995).
5. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRucTuRE OF CORPORATE LAw 1-39 (1991); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting
Out of FiduciaryDuties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L.
& EcON. 425 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract];Richard A. Epstein,
Contractand Trust in CorporateLaw: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1 (1996).
6. See generally Alison Gray Anderson, Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness
and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 1403 (1985);
Robert Charles Clark, Agency Costs versus FiduciaryDuties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNEss 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); John C. Coffee,
Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the ContractualTheory of the Corporation,and the Special Case
of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919 (1988) [hereinafter Coffee, No Exit?]; John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on the JudicialRole, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989) [hereinafter Coffee, Mandatory/EnablingBalance]; Deborah
A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879;
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47 STAN. L.
REV. 211 (1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits]; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of
CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461 (1989); Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71
CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990); Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on
Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377 (1990); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary
Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
7. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 5, at 12-15.
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term contract, that argument is untenable. Second, the debate has focused
on corporations. Partnerships and other unincorporated firms differ from
corporations in several ways that are relevant in the present context, including the absence of rhetoric implying that the firm is a "creature" of state
law, a general assumption that the parties' contract controls all important
elements of the relationship among the members, and idiosyncratic and
highly customizable terms that make mandatory duties particularly costly
in this context. Third, the anticontractarians have made assertions about the
present state of the positive law that no one so far has seriously refuted.
This Article's basic premise is the one forcefully stated by Easterbrook
and Fischel, who assert that fiduciary duties are simply a species of contract, "not a distinctive topic in law or economics. "I They show how a
transaction cost economics approach, which views fiduciary duties as
presumptive contract rules, better explains the positive law of fiduciary
duties, particularly including the variation across different relationships,
than do noncontractarian approaches that attempt to identify fiduciary duties
as a distinctive set of absolute duties. The present Article shows how this
analysis applies to fiduciary duty waivers in unincorporated firms.
This Article then moves beyond the Easterbrook-Fischel analysis in
two respects. First, it refutes specific arguments against enforcement of
fiduciary duty waivers whether or not these waivers are characterized as
contracts. Although my prior analysis of fiduciary duties in public corporations relies primarily on theories and evidence of public securities market
discipline of corporate contracts, 9 the present Article shows that arguments
for protecting individuals from potentially bad bargains in the context of
one-on-one bargaining in closely held firms are unfounded. Second, this
Article extensively analyzes cases relating to partnership fiduciary duties.
It shows that anticontractarians have misconstrued the positive law of
partnership and that restrictions in RUPA and the ULLCA would reverse
long-standing case law favoring the enforcement of contracts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I states the affirmative case for
enforcing contracts in unincorporated firms that is based primarily on the
inability of mandatory rules to cope with the significant variability of
contracts in this context. Part II then unpacks and refutes the arguments of

8. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 5, at 446. This view is consistent
with a prominent commentator's recent analysis of trust law. See John H. Langbein, The
ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (stating that
"despite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations,
fiduciary duties in trust law are unambiguously contractarian").
9. See generally Butler & Ribstein, supra note 5.
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the anticontractarians against contract enforcement. Part I discusses the
case law support for enforcing fiduciary duty waivers in partnerships.
I. The Case for Contract
Anticontractarians tend to emphasize only the arguments against
enforcing contracts without adequate consideration of the benefits of contracts in general and fiduciary duty waivers in particular. Even some
contractarian commentators slight this part of the equation. One recent
article in support of the contractual theory of partnership fiduciary duties
asserts that fiduciary duty contracts should be enforced because contracts
are important and the parties ought to be able to rely on them.' 0 This
provides an easy target for anticontractarians, who can counter with their
own assertion that, even if fiduciary duties are contractual, waivers of
fiduciary duties should not be enforced on efficiency or other grounds."
The normative case for enforcing contracts therefore must articulate the
economic costs and offsetting benefits of not enforcing fiduciary duty
contracts: That is the main task of this Part, after first summarizing the
theoretical basis of the contractarian approach to fiduciary duties.
A. FiduciaryDuties as a Hypothetical Bargain
Fiduciary duties can be characterized as a hypothetical bargain - that
is, contract terms the parties themselves would have agreed to in the
absence of transaction costs.'" This approach to fiduciary duties finds
explicit support in the case law.' 3 Anticipating the parties' own deal makes
10. See Hynes, supra note 3, at 38 (stating that "[m]andatory provisions are inconsistent with the bargain principle" of contract law). Professor Hynes demonstrates the

vulnerability of his argument by his lone citation in support of the "bargain principle" - an
article by a leading anticontractarian on the fiduciary duties issue. See id. at 38 n.44 (citing
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 742

(1982)).
11. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A CorporateLawyer Looks at
RUPA's Fiduciary Provisions,54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 465, 480-86 (1997).
12. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 5, at 427.

13. For a prominent example involving opinions by Judges Easterbrook and Posner,
see Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 26-28. Delaware Chancellor Allen has applied this reasoning and

concluded that a partner had no right to information in aid of a consent solicitation that
might injure the partners' joint investments in the firm by "[ilmagin[ing] individuals

negotiating the terms of a partnership agreement with respect to access to information."
Schwartzberg v. CR1TEF Assocs., 685 A.2d 365, 376 (Del. Ch. 1996). Chancellor Allen
here applied his earlier hypothetical bargain reasoning in Katz v. Oak Industries,Inc., 508
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sense as a way of economizing on contracting costs only if the parties could
make their own alternative deal. Otherwise, the court might as well supply
its own idea of the "right" contract terms regardless of whether the parties
would have wanted them. Thus, the application of hypothetical bargain
reasoning to fiduciary duties suggests that these duties are waivable.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the difference between hypothetical and actual bargains. This subpart explores in more detail the basis
and limits of the hypothetical bargain analysis, with particular focus on its
implications for fiduciary duty waivers.
1. The Basic Duty of Unselfishness
The nature of the fiduciary duty hypothetical bargain was described in
the classic statement by Judge Cardozo in Meinhardv. Salmon:'4
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion"
of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court. 5
As Justice Cardozo's statement makes clear, fiduciaries owe a duty of
unselfishness. Rather than the self-interest that the law permits in most
contractual relationships, fiduciaries owe "something stricter than the
morals of the market place." This duty fits the bargain that many fiduciaries and beneficiaries would likely make in the absence of transaction costs.
The beneficiary is willing to trust the fiduciary's discretion because the
fiduciary's skills can enhance the value of the beneficiary's property." Yet
an unconstrained fiduciary might selfishly diminish rather than increase the
value of the beneficiary's property. Because this would be a bad deal for
the beneficiary, the law assumes a contract that, as Justice Cardozo said,
requires the fiduciary to sacrifice his advantage to that of the beneficiary.
A.2d 873, 880-82 (Del. Ch. 1986).
14. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
15. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
16. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 744.
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2. Limits on Unselfishness
The hypothetical bargain analysis is useful not only in explaining why
fiduciary duties should be recognized in some relationships, but also in
showing why they should be modified or not even recognized in others.17
Because no one is bound to become a fiduciary in the first instance, a
beneficiary must pay a fiduciary to be selfless. 8 Whether a hypothetical
fiduciary duty bargain is justified depends on whether selfless conduct by
the fiduciary in a particular context is likely to be worth the price the
beneficiary would have to pay. For example, if the fiduciary-to-be believes
that there is a 50% chance of having to forgo a deal worth $100,000, this
represents a $50,000 opportunity cost (ignoring the time value of money)
of becoming a fiduciary. 9 The fiduciary-to-be similarly would take into
account the need to devote time unselfishly to the business. Before making
the leap to fiduciary status, the fiduciary-to-be would want to be assured of
being compensated for these sacrifices. The beneficiary, in turn, would be
willing to compensate the fiduciary for forgoing self-advantage only if this
would produce an adequate payoff. The deal the parties are likely to reach
will depend on the costs and benefits of fiduciary duties discussed below,'
such as whether the fiduciary's conduct can be more cheaply constrained
by restricting the fiduciary's power to act for the beneficiary. The extent
of selflessness for which the parties will contract also depends on the costs
of enforcing fiduciary duties. Litigation can be costly, time-consuming,
and error-prone. As a result, the beneficiary may consent to restrictions on
litigating, such as a rule that requires the parties to end their relationship
as a precondition to litigating disputes among themselves. 2' The costs of
enforcing fiduciary duties may lead the parties to substitute other constraints
on the fiduciary's conduct, including compensation, exit, and control rules.
This analysis explains why partners do not have default fiduciary duties in
connection with all aspects of their relationship with each other. For
17. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 5, at 432-34 (showing how
differences in costs and benefits of fiduciary duties in different contexts explain differences
among firms in default nature of fiduciary duties).

18.

See id. at 428.

19. Although it is unrealistic to suppose that anyone will be able to calculate these
opportunity costs, it is not unrealistic to suppose that one would make some sort of rough
calculation of what one is forgoing in entering into the relationship. The numbers are given
only to concretize the example.

20. See infra Parts I.C-D.
21. See generally Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: PropertyRules, Liability Rules,
and Exclusivity ofRemedies in Partnershipand Marriage,58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221
(Spring 1995).
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example, partners can dissolve the partnership or exercise a power under
the partnership agreement to expel another partner as long as these partners
do not act in bad faith.' Good faith is not a general duty to act unselfishly,
but rather is a more limited mechanism for applying other specific partner
rights under the agreement.' It makes good sense not to scrutinize exercise
of dissolution or expulsion powers under the exacting fiduciary standard
because partners need to be able freely to exercise such powers in order to
protect themselves from the abuses of their associates and managers.
Indeed, as discussed below,' the partners' ability to exit the relationship
and remove copartners may determine their need to be protected by fiduciary duties. Thus, constraining partners' ability to exercise self-help would
increase their vulnerability to precisely the same fiduciary abuses against
which fiduciary duties are supposed to protect. The hypothetical bargain
recognizes that partners normally would not want to pay their copartners
enough to force them to submit decisions concerning exit and expulsion to
close scrutiny under the fiduciary standard.
3. Hypothetical Versus Actual Bargains
The hypothetical bargain analysis raises questions about the extent to
which courts do and should enforce the parties' actual rather than hypothetical bargain. What courts are doing is obscured by the facts that the parties
never contract in complete detail and that the contours of the hypothetical
bargain depend on the same costs and benefits that motivate partners to
waive or to modify default fiduciary duties by explicit agreement. A highly
specified agreement that does not include an explicit waiver may mean that
the parties did not want fiduciary duties, standard duties, or a hypothetical
bargain modified to suit their particular relationship.' This ambiguity gives
courts significant leeway in interpreting agreements. For example, in
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,' Judge Easterbrook held that a default duty
to disclose an impending merger to shareholders who were selling their
stock to the firm was not waived by an actual contract that denied
22. See 2 ALAN A. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
§ 7.02, at 7:17-7:18 (1988) (discussing exercise of dissolution power); id.
§ 7.02, at 7:28-7:29 (discussing exercise of expulsion power).
23. See infra Part III.B.3.
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. The approach of courts to interpreting partnership agreements that do not include
explicit waivers is discussed in infra Part III.B.1.
26. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987). For other discussions, see DeMott, supra note 6, at
882-85.
PARTNERSHIP
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employee-shareholders the usual rights of shareholders.' Judge Posner
argued in dissent that the actual contract should control.' Judge Easterbrook later clarified his own view: "People write things down in order to
assign duties and allocate risks - functions vital to economic life yet
defeated if courts prefer hypothetical bargains over real ones or use the
ambiguities present in all language to frustrate the achievement of cer29
tainty."
The question of when, in Judge Easterbrook's words, courts should
"prefer hypothetical bargains over real ones" depends on the value of
contractual assignments of risk and allocations of duty discussed below in
Part I.C and on the strength of the arguments against enforcing contracts
discussed below in Part H1. In short, the hypothetical bargain analysis alone
does not provide a complete or easy answer to questions concerning what
courts do or should do about fiduciary duty waivers.
B. The Inevitability of Contract
Easterbrook and Fischel note not only that default fiduciary duties
mirror parties' actual bargains, but also that "[a]ctual contracts [concerning
fiduciary duties] always prevail over implied ones.""' In other words,
contracts adjust to any rules imposed by courts or legislatures. Thus,
enforcing fiduciary duty opt-outs is, in Easterbrook and Fischel's words,
"all but inevitable."31 As discussed below in Part HI, parties to agency
relationships can, among other things, vary the fiduciary duty waiver to
narrowly avoid the prohibited language, use compensation or other devices
to accomplish effects similar to waiver,32 form under a state law that is
more receptive to opt-outs, or select a different type of relationship that
does not impose mandatory duties. Given enforcement of most contract
terms, regulation of specific contract terms, however normatively justified,
may be trivial. 3
27. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 444 (Posner, J., dissenting).
29. Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
bank secured creditor had no implied duty to disclose riskiness of collateral to guarantor).
30. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 5, at 427.
31. See id. at 431.
32. Cf. Vestal, Revolution, supra note 4, at 1591-92 (noting that list of nonwaivable
provisions in RUPA Section 103(b) is exclusive, thereby permitting waiver of other provisions).
33. For more extensive discussions of the "triviality" of business association rules, see
Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?:A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U.
L. REV. 542 (1990), and Larry E. Ribstein, Efficiency, Regulation and Competition:A Corn-
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Nevertheless, courts and legislatures can and do make contracting more
difficult. Alternative permitted arrangements are not completely fungible
with agreements that are not enforced. For example, organizing under the
law of another state imposes a cost of doing business as a "foreign" entity
that may be a significant portion of a closely held firm's operating costs.
Thus, the normative question of which rules ought to be mandatory, while
perhaps not as important as it might seem on the surface, is not trivial.
C. Varying Benefits of FiduciaryDuties:Alternative Constraints
Because there are many situations in which it would be in the parties'
interest to waive default fiduciary duties, the "uncompromising rigidity" of
fiduciary duties imagined by Justice Cardozo is unworkable. As Easterbrook and Fischel point out, mandatory rules may force the parties to enter
into inefficient bargains.'M The efficiency of a fiduciary waiver can be fully
evaluated only by analyzing the entire contract rather than by looking at the
waiver in isolation. The beneficiary presumably will not be willing to pay
the fiduciary to forgo self-advantage if the latter is otherwise constrained to
act in a manner that is not too detrimental to the beneficiary.35 The following are some examples of how the benefits of fiduciary duties may vary in
different contexts.
(1) The narrower the discretion delegated, the narrower the duty of
unselfishness the parties will need. For example, the beneficiary may give
a fiduciary (say, a stock broker) an immediate order to buy or sell at a
specific price rather than a "limit" order to buy or sell when the market
price hits a specific target. The broker is still a fiduciary in this situation
and therefore must use due care in exercising the order and refrain from
charging excess commissions or markups. But the specific nature of the
order eliminates the problem of the fiduciary's preventing the execution of
the limit order by engaging in transactions for his own account. 36
ment on Easterbrook & Fischel'sEconomic Structure of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
254 (1992).
34. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract,supra note 5, at 431; see also Ribstein, Prime
Time, supra note 3, at 58 (briefly listing types of efficient deals that may be precluded by
mandatory rules).
35. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 5, at 18-53 (discussing contractual and market
constraints on managers' conduct); Dickerson, Looking Glass, supra note 4, at 985 (discussing
such constraints as limiting actual conflicts that exist between fiduciaries and beneficiaries);
Thompson, supra note 6, at 379 (noting that existence of constraints affects level of fiduciary
duties that is appropriate in particular relationship).
36. See In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, 41 SEC Docket
413 (July 6, 1988).
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(2) The beneficiary can reduce agency costs by monitoring and
restricting transactions entered into by the fiduciary. Fiduciary duties may
be appropriate for firms with dispersed, passive owners for whom active
monitoring is impractical. But in some firms, such as many closely held
firms, the beneficiary may have both an ability and a need to monitor
whether or not the fiduciary is subject to fiduciary duties. For example, the
beneficiary may have idiosyncratic preferences about what actions the firm
should take and therefore would seek to control the fiduciary even if
fiduciary duties eliminated all possibility of harmful selfish behavior.
Accordingly, strict fiduciary duties in such firms may be unnecessarily
costly.
(3) The fiduciary's conduct may be better constrained through contractual provisions that are designed for particular types of firms and relationships. These include forbidding the fiduciary, from engaging in certain
types of potentially harmful activities or compensation that aligns the
fiduciary's incentives with the beneficiary's interests.37
(4) The beneficiary may be able to discipline the fiduciary through a
power to exit the relationship. A corporate shareholder can sell stock, a
partner can dissolve at will, and a principal can terminate an agency relationship at any time. The power to exit may sometimes be a fully effective
constraint. To be sure, the power to exit may not in itself redress pre-exit
misconduct. However, exit can deny the fiduciary any future gains from
the relationship. Although this alone may not be enough to prevent a
fiduciary from making a large one-time gain, the threat of exit may give a
fiduciary an incentive to avoid less pronounced shirking. At the same time,
even the threat of criminal fiduciary liability may not be fully effective.
(5) The beneficiary may be able to remove the fiduciary. The impact
of this removal on the fiduciary will depend on how much the fiduciary has
invested in the relationship in specific human capital or otherwise. The risk
of losing a substantial investment may powerfully constrain the fiduciary's
conduct.
(6) The fiduciary may have reputational incentives to act in the
beneficiary's interests. Bank trustees and promoters of real estate, venture
37. See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants:An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Venture PartnershipAgreements, 39 J.L. & ECoN. 463, 473 (1996). Gompers and Lemer
summarize various types of covenants that have been used to constrain the discretion of
managers of venture capital partnerships. Id. at 480-84. Covenants controlling managers'
conduct have also been used to protect creditors. See generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &
Jerold B. Warner, On FinancialContracting:An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EON.
117 (1979). In this case, the covenants stand as the creditors' only protection because courts
generally do not recognize fiduciary duties in this context. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
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capital, and other types of investment syndicates are judged in succeeding
transactions by their records in prior deals.3 8 Thus, even if the fiduciary
can cheat a given firm without legal consequences, inadequate performance
could reduce the price of the fiduciary's services in other deals.
(7) Nonmanagerial owners of firms may choose to rely on third-party
monitoring. For example, default or contract rules limit the managers'
agency power to bind the firm to major transactions that often involve selfdealing, such as guarantees of the managing partner's loans. Such rules
force sophisticated third parties, such as banks and other lenders, to determine whether the transaction will harm the beneficiary before relying on the
firm's credit.3 9
D. Varying Costs of FiduciaryDuties
The costs, like the benefits, of fiduciary duties may vary from firm to
firm. These potential costs provide reasons for substituting the alternative
constraints on fiduciary conduct discussed in Part I.A. The following are
some ways in which the costs of fiduciary duties may vary.
(1) Fiduciaries have varying costs of forgoing opportunities outside
the firm. Strict rules on conflicts of interest and partnership opportunities
may be particularly costly for the fiduciary, such as a real estate syndicator,
who must balance extensive outside interests. On the other hand, such
constraints may be relatively necessary when the nature of the firm's
activities makes it particularly difficult for the beneficiary to monitor the
fiduciary.'
(2) Finns and insiders have potential scope economies of information
in buying from and selling to each other by reason of information acquired
in their other dealings. Insiders therefore can charge a lower risk premium
than outsiders in transacting business with the firm. At the same time, an
38. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 37, at 473 (noting that need for covenants'
controlling conduct of managing partners of venture capital funds diminishes as managers
are increasingly constrained by reputational concerns). On the role of reputational constraints on opportunistic conduct generally, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role
of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. EcON. 615 (1981);
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, AppropriableRents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &ECON. 297 (1978); and Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1983).
39. See Deborah A. DeMott, Our Partners'Keepers? Agency Dimensionsof Partnership Relationships, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. POBS. 109, 131-34 (Spring 1995).
40. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 37, at 473 (noting that covenants restricting
activities of managers of venture capital partnerships may be more necessary for funds that
invest in early-stage and high-technology companies for which accounting and other
information is unreliable or unavailable).
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insider-debtor may be a better credit risk because the firm has both more
information about the insider and more leverage because it can discipline
misconduct through expulsion or other means. The firm also may have
specialized needs for property and services that only an owner can supply.
A mandatory rule against self-dealing would sacrifice these potential benefits of dealing with insiders because a fiduciary who must forgo all gain in
the transaction would have no incentive to deal with the firm. Although the
firm might be able to compensate the creditor- or lessor-owner or manager
by a larger profit share, this would be a second-best alternative to directing
the compensation to particular transactions. Moreover, the fiduciary might
be denied valuable remedies such as loan foreclosure or lease termination
that would be available to one who is dealing as a nonfiduciary.
(3) Fiduciary duties arise in relationships in which it is in the beneficiary's interest to delegate open-ended decisionmaking power to the fiduciary. 4 Yet fiduciary duties can undermine the main purpose of delegating
power to the fiduciary by impeding the fiduciary's exercise of discretion.42
In particular, a duty of care may force the fiduciary to refrain from conduct
that may be construed to have been unduly risky if, ex post, the conduct is
unprofitable. This is particularly a problem in firms that have passive,
limited liability investors whose investment in the firm is part of a diversified portfolio. In this situation, placing the risk of failure on a single nondiversified manager may cause the fiduciary to act more cautiously than the
members would prefer.43
(4) Prohibiting waivers may preclude efficient compensation arrangements. Awarding the fiduciary a piece of the firm's overall profits may not
spur the specific efforts that the firm wants from the fiduciary. For example, a professional firm might incentivize its members by allowing them to
keep the fruits of their relationships with their "own" clients, including
investments in the clients. Or a firm may let fiduciaries trade on information created by their efforts' or keep some of the opportunities they discover in the course of their searches on behalf of the firm. 45 Prohibiting

41. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 640 (observing that fiduciary duties first arose in
trust relationships when new uses of trusts made it beneficial to expand trustees' powers).
42. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 749.
43. As a result, fiduciary duties may be more costly precisely in situations in which
they are most beneficial because of beneficiaries' inability to monitor. See supra Part I.C.
44. See HENRY G.MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138-41 (1966);
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1983).
45. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 5, at 437.
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such contracts may force the firm to provide for second-best methods of
incentivizing the fiduciary.
(5) Fiduciary duties may be costly not only because of the potentially
perverse impact of the duties themselves, but also because of the costs of
enforcing them,' including the direct costs of litigation and the indirect
costs of disrupting the relationship. High enforcement costs help to explain
why partnership law historically has permitted fiduciary duty litigation
among partners only in the course of a global resolution of partnership
affairs.47 For example, a law firn may want to delegate full discretion over
lawyer compensation to a committee because a fiduciary duty would inevitably lead to litigation over the "fairness" of compensation awarded. The
members could rely on their exit power to constrain the managers' discretion.
II. Arguments Against Enforcing FiduciaryDuty Waivers
In light of Part I's discussion of the potential costs of fiduciary duties
in particular settings and the consequent benefits of fiduciary duty waivers,
there ought to be at least a strong presumption in favor of enforcing such
waivers. This Part considers whether there may be offsetting deficiencies
in the contracting process that might justify not enforcing waivers despite
their potential benefits. The anticontractarians' arguments in favor of such
deficiencies have a different flavor in unincorporated firms than they do in
the debate over waiver of fiduciary duties in publicly held corporations.'
In the latter context, the anticontractarians focus on passive investors'
unthinking acceptance of terms embodied in a remote publicly filed charter.
The antiwaiver argument is a harder sell in most closely held unincorporated firms in which terms are often negotiated or voted on face-to-face and
approved unanimously.49 Fiduciary waivers in unincorporated firms closely
resemble the sort of "real" contracts that anticontractarians have held out
as models in the public corporation debate. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the arguments against freedom of contract now must shift ground
46. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking - Some TheoreticalPerspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel
& Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in CorporateLaw:
A Theoreticaland EmpiricalAnalysis,71 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1986).
47. See Levmore, supra note 21, at 242-43.
48. As to the latter debate, see generally Butler & Ribstein, supra note 5.
49. Indeed, some anticontractarian commentators have stressed the greater enforceability of contracts in the context of the closely held firm. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,

CORPORATE LAw 233-41 (1986); Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at
CorporateOpportunities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1001-20 (1981).
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to such factors as defects in reasoning or in the bargaining process. The
difference is that anticontractarians must show that these defects are so
pronounced for fiduciary waivers as to distinguish them from contracts that
are normally enforced. This Part unpacks the arguments that anticontractarians make against enforcement of fiduciary duty waivers in unincorporated firms and shows that they are unpersuasive.
A. Ex Post Harm to the Beneficiary
One justification that has been given for refusing to enforce a fiduciary
duty waiver is simply that the beneficiary may be harmed by the fiduciary's
conduct.' This is obviously misguided. It is no different from arguing that
a contract should not be enforced simply because one party experiences
regret in the sense that the contract's ultimate consequences favored one
party rather than the other. This approach is fundamentally inconsistent
with the theory of bargained-for exchange that underlies contract law. As
in any other contract, the parties bargain ex ante for the terms, including
the price, in light of their expectations of potential outcomes. Thus,
because of the beneficiary's expectation that the fiduciary may cheat or
shirk, the fiduciary may have to give up compensation or power or give the
beneficiary an exit right in return for the beneficiary's giving up fiduciary
remedies. Each party's promises presumably have value to the other. The
parties themselves are in the best position to determine how to optimize
agency costs in a particular relationship. Ex post decisionmaking would
eliminate parties' incentives to make these agreements. In short, any justification for not enforcing fiduciary duty waivers must be based on the
circumstances at the time of entering into the contract and not merely on
how the contract turned out.
B. Unknowable or UnforeseeableRisks
Some commentators have emphasized that waivers are intended to
operate over a long time period, during which much can happen that the
parties cannot foresee at the time of contracting." This means that parties
to fiduciary waivers may not be able to accurately price the risk they are
taking or to cheaply ensure that the risk is not unmanageably large.' In
50. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 102.
51. See generally Brudney, supra note 6; Coffee, No Exit?, supra note 6; Thompson,

supra note 6.
52. See Hynes, supra note 3, at 44-45. Hynes says that the waiver itself is a signal
of a problem of untrustworthiness. However, the opposite inference also could follow -
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other words, there is an asymmetry of information between fiduciaries, who
presumably have extensive information about their future conduct, and
beneficiaries, who do not know what fiduciaries will do. As a result, the
contract may not efficiently allocate resources in the sense of maximizing
the contracting parties' utility. This argument is particularly noteworthy in
the present context because it was emphasized by Professor Melvin

Eisenberg in a letter to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) that may have influenced the Commissioners to insert mandatory fiduciary duties into RUPA.53
There are several problems with this argument. First, the argument

overstates the beneficiary's ignorance. The beneficiary is aided by numerous signals concerning the fiduciary's future actions, including the fiduciary's reputation and the other constraints on fiduciary conduct discussed

in Part I. 4 Second, the asymmetric information argument is breathtakingly
broad. Because information is inherently costly, ignorance is a possibility
in every contract, depending on how much the parties want to spend to be
informed.55 Because there is no reason to believe that both parties will be

equally ignorant, their information is obviously asymmetric. This is true
not only of fiduciary duty waivers, but also of compensation, governance,
exit, and other terms of business associations. Most important, the argu-

ment could apply to fiduciary duties, 56the costs of which may be unknowable
over the course of the relationship.
that is, that there are enough assurances of trustworthiness that fiduciary duties are unnecessary.
53. See Letter of Professor Melvin Eisenberg to NCCUSL 2-4 (July 17, 1992), discussed
in Hynes, supra note 3, at 37 n.38; Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 59 n.103.
54. Sellers or borrowers can signal the extent of risks by, for example, offering to sell
their products at a lower price without a warranty.. See Alan Schwartz, Legal Implication of
Imperfect Information in Consmwer Markets, 151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 31,
42, 44 (1995). However, contracting parties may send inefficient signals because of wealth
differences or because they know consumers will not buy protection at any price. See id. at
45-46 (noting that* legislators cannot obtain sufficient information to regulate signals efficiently). Also, sellers or borrowers may overcommit assets to signaling in order to avoid
adverse inferences from failing to send signals. See Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin,
Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381,
382 (1990). The latter commentary indirectly supports a no-duty default rule because it
suggests that parties may fail to waive fiduciary duties even when such waivers are efficient
in order to avoid sending a false signal of unreliability. Cf. Hynes, supra note 3, at 44-45
(noting possibility of negative inferences). Detailed examination of this issue is outside the
scope of this Article.
55. See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON.
213 (1961).
56. See supra Part I.D (discussing costs of fiduciary duties).
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Third, and most important, the asymmetric information argument is
unconvincing because it is not apparent why the parties cannot and do not
contract in light of their information costs and deficiencies. Confronted
with an unknowable risk from waiving fiduciary duties, the parties will
price the term accordingly or draft a more specific provision.' This is
based on the concept of "bounded rationality" - that is, that people can and
do act (and contract) in view of their limitations. 8 This principle helps to
explain the default rule of fiduciary duties. A principal delegates control
to an agent because the principal knows that she lacks specialized information, and then contracts to bind the fiduciary by fiduciary duties because she
knows that she may not be able fully to protect herself from the fiduciary's
actions given the information disparity.59 That principals know enough to
enter into these bargains suggests that they know enough to contract around
these bargains in appropriate cases.'
C. Cognition and Rationality Constraints
Perhaps recognizing that mere lack of information or knowledge should
not prevent enforcement of contracts that inherently operate into the unknowable future, some anticontractarians - particularly Professor
Eisenberg - have moved beyond unforeseeability to emphasize cognition
problems that prevent complete processing of information, and therefore
cause people to make contracts that are irrational in light of what they
know.6 For example, Eisenberg cites evidence that people are unrealistically optimistic about the nonoccurrence of such risks as product injuries
and a marriage partner's likelihood of nonpayment of alimony;62 tend to
"frame" choices so as to make irrational distinctions between risk associated
57. The information asymmetry argument may justify setting the default rule to encourage contracting parties to reveal information. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
Once this default rule is set, the waiver provides the requisite signal. But see supra note 54
(discussing how default fiduciary duties may send misleading signals).
58. See Herbert A. Simon, A BehavioralModel of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99,
101 (1955). These limitations may include lack of information or capacity or distorted
reasoning. See Kenneth E. Scott, Bounded Rationality and Social Norms, 150 J. INsnTUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EON. 315, 315 (1994). Information problems are discussed above
in Part lI.A, while cognition and reasoning problems are discussed below in Part ll.C.
Bounded rationality as a separate topic refers to parties' actions in light of their limitations.
59. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 113 (4th ed. 1992).
60. Dean Weidner ignores this concept. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 100 n.84 (citing

Posner).
61. See generally Eisenberg, Limits, supra note 6.
62. Id. at 216-18.
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with gain and risk associated with loss;63 make decisions based on information that is "readily available" to their minds rather than in light of a
balanced set of information;' erroneously assume that a small sample of
present events represents, and so accurately predicts, future events;' and
systematically underestimate or overestimate risks such as floods or earthquakes. 66 According to Eisenberg, "[g]iven the limits of cognition, the core
duty-of-loyalty rules should not be subject to a general waiver. '"67 Among
other things, beneficiaries would be unduly optimistic about the probability
of fair conduct by managers and would irrationally assume that their present
good relationships will continue into the future.
Eisenberg's article is part of a much broader literature that stresses
limits on rationality as justification for paternalistic constraints on contracting. 68 Eisenberg's analysis at least has the virtue of relating fiduciary duty
waivers in firms to contracts generally. However, it is important to note
that the problems Eisenberg discusses appear to be much more pervasive,
and to affect many more people, than the more serious limitations on
judgment that undermine the individual autonomy that is essential for free
contracting.69
First, it is not clear whether people are, in fact, irrational or whether
they are acting rationally in light of limited or costly information. For
example, "availability" may just mean that in some circumstances it is not
worth it to acquire additional information. Also, that people miscalculate
risks in an experimental setting does not mean that they will do so when the
benefits of a more precise calculation outweigh the costs - that is, when
they are deciding whether to insure or to opt out of fiduciary duties.
Second, even if individualsare irrational, it does not follow that entire
markets are irrational as well. 0 Even if some investors irrationally down-

play risks, fiduciaries are constrained not to offer inefficient waivers by
63.

Id. at 218-20.

64. Id. at 220-21.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id. at 223.
67. Id. at 249.
68. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMrTs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
147-63 (1993); Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternalism,15 INT'L REV.L. & ECON. 489
(1995); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763
(1983).

69. See generally Kronman, supra note 68.
70. The classic expression of this view is Gary S. Becker, IrrationalBehavior and
Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962). For a discussion of market responses to
bounded rationality problems, see Scott, supra note 58, at 317-18.
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competiti6n for investment capital. Suppose a fiduciary, such as a general
partner in a limited partnership real estate syndication, offers a contract that
includes a fiduciary duty waiver whose expected costs outweigh its benefits.
Suppose further that, despite the considerations discussed in the preceding
subpart, some investors fail adequately to assess the disadvantages of the
waiver. If some offerees do correctly assess the risks, then they will bid
less for the contract with the waiver than for comparable contracts without
it. Unless the fiduciary can price discriminate, which may be impractical
in a syndication given securities disclosure and offering rules, the fiduciary
would have to offer the waiver at a lower price to all investors, including
the irrational ones. Thus, fiduciary waivers are likely to be priced fairly
for syndications even if some investors are irrational. It further follows that
investor irrationality, if it exists, is most likely to be a problem in idiosyncratic deals in which there is direct bargaining between investors and
fiduciaries. Yet in this situation the parties are most likely to carefully
analyze the deal. At the same time, courts may be least able to determine
whether the waiver is irrational because of the uniqueness of the deal and
the unavailability of a market-determined price for the waiver.
Third, any rationality and cognition problems that may exist do not
justify refusing to enforce an entire class of long-term contracts. If a
contract is invalid merely because one of the parties could not clearly and
objectively foresee the future or did not accurately anticipate the particular
result that occurred, then any executory contract is in jeopardy, including
rules on voting, exit, or compensation in business associations.71 Yet courts
commonly enforce these rules, and no anticontractarian has asserted that
such rules generally should not be enforced. ' Eisenberg implies instead
that the only contracts that should not be enforced are those with respect to
which parties' cognitive defects would prevent them from anticipating
accurately "too many" bad results. This would include waivers of fiduciary
duties that would leave bargainers unprotected from too large a category of
fiduciaries' self-interested abuse of their powers under the voting, exit, and
other terms of the business association. Thus, Eisenberg suggests that "[a]n
agreement that a specific type of business venture will not be deemed a
corporate opportunity" might be enforced.73 Yet, under Eisenberg's theory,
71. If people are too irrational to contract, it is unclear why they should be allowed
to make any important choices, including voting, driving, having abortions, getting married,
or having children.
72. Eisenberg, Limits, supra note 6, at 254 (asserting that cognitive defects explain
rules that "allow easy exit on fair terms from thick relationships" such as partnerships
without explaining why rules are not mandatory).
73. See Eisenberg, Limits, supra note 6, at 249.
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even these investors would be unduly optimistic about the quality of the
opportunities the fiduciary would be able to keep out of the firm. The
apparent reason for the distinction is not that bargainers may fail rationally
to assess the costs of this permitted type of contract, but rather that the
parties to the contract, although irrational, are being sufficiently reasonable
about their irrationality. Eisenberg must explain why some contracts are
reasonable and others are not despite the fact that both are subject to
cognitive defects.'"

D. BargainingDefects
If bargainers' information and cognitive deficiencies do not justify
mandatory fiduciary duties, then perhaps, according to the anticontractarians, fiduciary duty waivers suffer from defects in the process by which
such contracts are made. 5 The problem here is not that the parties do not
understand the effect of their actions, but that they cannot do what they
know they should do in order to maximize their utility.7'
Contract terms cannot easily be imposed on helpless investors in
closely held firms. Indeed, two prominent commentators who lean toward
the anticontractarian position with respect to publicly held firms have
argued that the relatively small number of owners in closely held firms
normally should be deemed to be capable of giving viable consent to
outside dealings.' Unlike, for example, automobile warranties, in which
one might contend that consumers face an oligopoly that offers few contracting choices for a product most consumers need, closely held firms
compete with myriad alternative investment opportunities. To be sure,
investors' choice of investments may be limited in some circumstances, as
when the demand for a particular type of investment exceeds the supply,
and these limitations may affect investors' ability to bargain for constraints
74. In addition, Eisenberg must explain how judges can overcome rationality problems
that are common to all humans in deciding which contracts are reasonable. See infra text
accompanying notes 135-37.
75. Sometimes it is difficult to separate these arguments in the anticontractarian literature. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 100 (listing combination of cognition and bargaining
problems).
76. Some commentators have argued that the power fiduciaries wield over beneficiaries
should negate any waiver of fiduciary duties. See Dickerson, Looking Glass, supra note 4,
at 993; Hynes, supra note 3, at 43-44 (suggesting that mutual trust in agency should weigh
against opt-out, although generally arguing in favor of waivability). The obvious problem with
this argument is that it fails to explain why a beneficiary should not be able to agree to a
modification or waiver of fiduciary duties before the power arising out of the relationship is
created.
77. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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on fiduciaries' conduct.78 Yet investors can always choose an alternative
type of investment when their choices are less limited.
Arguments concerning bargaining problems in this context focus not
on the range of choices available to contracting parties, but rather on their
ability to utilize these choices in the environment in which partnership contracts are negotiated. For example, anticontractarians have noted bargainers' inclination to trust each other rather than risk aggressive negotiations
that may "queer" the deal.7 9 Another commentator has asserted that private
ordering is hampered by the usual informality of partnership, the unsophistication of the parties and their counsel, the fact that one attorney may
represent all of the parties, the parties' tendency at the outset to underestimate the risk of dispute,' and the frequent resort to forms."1 But these
observations explain only why bargainers will tend to accept default rules
rather than attempt to insert idiosyncratic and possibly controversial provisions such as fiduciary duty waivers. They fail to explain why actual
contracts should not be enforced.
Even if the bargaining process contains defects that cause bargainers
to accept inefficient customized rules, it is not clear what mandatory rules
would accomplish. If one party were inhibited from bargaining, blocking
one specific contractual exit route will accomplish very little. The "superior" bargainer would simply substitute an alternative, such as a slightly
more specific opt-out or higher compensation.'
E. Externalities
Commentators have made a variety of arguments against fiduciary duty
waivers that purportedly are based on costs to people other than the parties
to the waivers. First, they assert that fiduciary duty waivers will encourage
managers to make socially wasteful investments in opportunistic conduct.'
78. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 37, at 469-72 (showing how amount and extent
of covenants' restricting managers' conduct in venture capital partnerships depend to some
extent on supply of such firms and amount of capital available for investment).
79. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. CoFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 64 (6th ed. 1996); Coffee, Mandatory/EnablingBalance, supra note 6, at 1677;
Weidner, supra note 4, at 100 n.83.
80. This particular argument appears to refer to the cognition problems discussed above
in Part II.C.
81. See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships,41 U. MIAMI L. REv.
425, 433-42 (1987).
82. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 5, at 432.
83. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 101. Weidner supports this assertion by citing a
discussion in POSNER, supra note 59, at 109-10, of socially wasteful investments in disseminating misinformation, which is a different problem from opportunism.
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This is not, however, an externality at all because any "opportunistic" conduct the contract permits injures only the beneficiary, who can contract to
minimize this risk. Moreover, merely because the beneficiary might have
been better off under a different contract does not mean that the fiduciary's
conduct is social waste. It is just as true that the fiduciary might have been
better off in the sense of being able more fully to pursue her self-interest
without fiduciary constraints. The question is what set of rules best balances the expected benefits to the fiduciary from exploiting opportunities
that relate to the firm against the expected benefits to the beneficiary from
directing the fiduciary's conduct toward the firm. The beneficiary and
fiduciary can be expected to design the contract to optimize their mutual
benefits. Although the parties may miscalculate in light of subsequent
events, the risk of miscalculation is even greater under a mandatory rule
that attempts to regulate many different types of contracts.
A second externality-based argument is that permitting fiduciary duty
opt-outs may hurt parties who must incur extra costs to understand, and
possibly avoid, these customized terms.' This argument makes little sense
even in the context of publicly held corporations with standardized contract
terms." It makes even less sense in the context of highly variable and
customized partnership agreements. In this context, checking to see
whether a clause exists and shunning terms that seem to pose problems
impose little additional burden on contracting. In any event, this is not an
externality because the waiving firm itself. incurs the supposed costs in
dealing with investors. Thus, if standardization has net benefits, firms will
have incentives to adopt standardized fiduciary duty opt-outs or not to
waive fiduciary duties.'
Third, one commentator argues that enforcing fiduciary duty waivers
would impact other than just the contracting parties by encouraging all
business people to ignore fiduciary norms.Y But it is not clear why this
84. See Coffee, No Exit?, supra note 6, at 434-50; Weidner, supra note 4, at 102 n.89.
Weidner also notes the parties' need to invest resources to protect themselves against misrepresentations. This is unrelated to problems relating to fiduciary duty opt-outs.
85. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 5, at 34-35 (discussing role of analysts in evaluating terms).
86. A more subtle variation on the excessive variety argument is that opting out of
fiduciary duties hurts those who do not opt out by decreasing the amount of case law that
might clarify the meaning of fiduciary duties. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1549, 1593-94 (1989). For criticism of this
point, see Butler & Ribstein, supra note 5, at 56-58. Among other problems with this
argument, it anomalously assumes that the standard term would die out without regulatory
protection - that is, that opting out would become too popular.
87. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the
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might happen. Indeed, there is no evidence that it has happened despite the
parties' ability to opt out of fiduciary duties under current law.'
Fourth, and perhaps least relevant, is the assertion that allowing
fiduciary duty waivers will impose costs on the legal system of remedying
disappointment and opportunism.A9 The extent to which the law should
untangle ex post disappointment is the precise question involved in enforcing fiduciary opt-outs. Indeed, the argument could be turned around in two
respects. Contractual fiduciary duties impose costs on the tax-supported
legal system that are not fully borne by the contracting parties. From this
perspective, the externality is associated with fiduciary duties themselves
and not with opt-outs. Also, not enforcing contract terms such as fiduciary
duty waivers is at least as likely to create disappointment and opportunism
as would enforcing these terms. In this case, the disappointment is that of
the fiduciary who relied on waiver, and the opportunism is that of the beneficiary who seizes on a technical reason for nonenforcement in order to hold
the fiduciary ex post to obligations the latter never agreed to undertake.
F. "Noneconomic" Considerations
A final set of arguments against enforcement of fiduciary waivers is
that the case for enforcement rests on economic arguments about transaction
costs and property rights that ignore important noneconomic, or at least
nonefficiency, values. The basis of these arguments is not always clear.
These arguments may simply restate the efficiency-based anticontractarian
arguments discussed above in this Part. To the extent that the arguments
are, in fact, "noneconomic," they may lead to rules that would impose real
costs on society without commensurate benefits. 9'
Some commentators argue that fiduciary duty opt-outs may have unfair
or unjust effects on beneficiaries. 9 ' This may mean that, viewed ex post,
the contract gave the beneficiary cause for regret. This seems to be either
a frontal attack on the basic contract principle that one should be able to
bind oneself ex ante to ex post results, or simply an argument that the
contracting parties' consent sometimes results from bargaining or cognition
problems discussed above in this Part. 9 Either argument would require a
Commons, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 399, 401 (1997).
88. See infra PartlU.
89. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 102-03.
90. See ALAN SCHWARTZ, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO CONTRACT THEORY
26-28 (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 123) (criticizing noneconomic
arguments against enforcing contracts on similar grounds).
91. See Vestal, Response, supra note 4, at 70-72.
92. See supra Part II.C.
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court to substitute its own judgment as to what an objectively "fair" or
"just" result would be.93 Moreover, to the extent that fairness or justice is
just a replay of the rationality, bargaining, and information problems
discussed above, it is subject to all of the criticisms of these arguments that

have been discussed.
Commentators also have suggested that mandatory fiduciary duty rules

force managers to engage in behavior that is appropriate because it is
ethical, 94 instills trust in beneficiaries,' or complies with generally accepted
business norms.' But it is not clear what the "right" behavior is. Commentators' own conclusions are wholly subjective. One person's salutary
norm of cooperation may be another's way to facilitate undesirable wealth
transfers.' Nor is it necessarily enough to rely on statements by judges
such as that by Justice Cardozo in Meinhard.98 Judges are not necessarily

experts on proper business behavior. They may use colorful language in
order to increase their own reputations' or apply an elevated standard in
order to bring more business disputes into court."° If judges are correctly
interpreting business norms that have arisen spontaneously outside of
court,0' it is still not clear whether these norms are objectively "right" in
any sense.'0
93. See generally David Charny, HypotheticalBargains:The Normative Structure of
ContractInterpretation,89 MICH. L. REv. 1815 (1991).
94. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 104.
95. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1686-88; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness
and Trust in CorporateLaw, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 429 (1993). Like the other considerations
discussed in this subpart, trust does not have to be viewed as a noneconomic concept. See
generally Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 453 (1993) (distinguishing between trust in economic, or "calculative," sense, and
personal trust).
96. See Mitchell, supra note 95, at 430-31. See generally Dickerson, supra note 87;
Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat..." : The Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 487 (1997).

97. Cf. John R. Lott, Jr., An Explanationfor Public Provision of Schooling: The
Importance of Indoctrination,33 J.L. & ECON. 199 (1990) (arguing that public education
instills views that make it easier for state to effectuate wealth transfers).
98. See supra text accompanying note 15.
99. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
100. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALl Code, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 984, 1031-32 (1993).
101. For two important studies of the spontaneous creation of business norms, see
ROBERT C. ELLIcKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)

and Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business:A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM.

Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
102. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
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This uncertainty about applicable norms is amply demonstrated by
Professor Vestal's article in this Symposium. 103 Vestal uses the recent case
of Beasley v. Cadwalader,Wickersham & Taft,"°4 which awarded substantial
compensatory and punitive damages to a partner who was expelled by a
large law firm in order to maximize profits for the remaining partners, 10 5
to show why it is important to maintain norms to deter conduct like that
involved in Beasley. The court condemned the attitude of the Co-Chair of
the management committee, who was quoted as saying, in part: "[L]ife is
not made up of love, it is made up of fear and greed and money - how
But the issues become more
much you get paid in large measure.""
complicated when the facts cited in the opinion are viewed from the law
firm's perspective. From this angle, rather than expelling the plaintiff, the
firm closed its unprofitable Florida office and offered the plaintiff an
opportunity to move to the main office in New York."° The plaintiff, who
had been planning to leave the firm in any event,"0 8 declined the offer.
Even if the plaintiff was terminated, the firm may just have used the wrong
procedure. As Professor Vestal points out, °' 9 and as was recently confirmed by the highest court in New York" ° (whose law controlled in
Beasley), the firm could have terminated the plaintiff by dissolving and
re-forming without him. The firm's management committee acted not
directly to enrich itself, but to prevent the firm's destruction by departure
of its most productive lawyers.1 2 Indeed, in talking about "greed," the
Cadwalader manager was only emphasizing that the productive partners
would not have stayed in the firm for "love" only, but would have left
unless the management committee acted as it did to save the firm.
What, then, does Beasley say about the applicable norms? Do these
norms permit the firm to dissolve and re-form without the partners, consis1697, 1711-24 (1996) (discussing how inefficient norms may arise).
103. See generally Vestal, supra note 96.
104. 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
105. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, at *8-*9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
106. Id. at *7.
107. See id. at *2-*3.
108. Indeed, for that reason plaintiff was denied damages for lost income. See id. at *8.
109. See Vestal, supra note 96, at 505-06.
110. See Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 591-92 (N.Y. 1996).
111. See Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-96-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
449247, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1996) (order denying motion for summary judgment,
making findings of fact, and determining questions of law).
112. See id. at *7 (quoting Co-Chair of management committee).
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tent with what the highest New York court called "the principle that part-

ners may choose with whom they wish to be associated"?113 If not, must
the management committee stand by and watch the country's oldest law
firm be destroyed by the departure of its most productive partners? If they

were planning on leaving anyway, did Beasley and the other Florida partners violate any norms by holding out for a special buyout package in
excess of the amount provided for in the partnership agreement,114 knowing
that their firm could not legally expel them? Would departure by the
productive partners whose threat to leave supposedly provoked Beasley's
termination violate norms against "greed," or instead be consistent with
another arguably applicable norm, enforced by the ethics rules, of uphold115
ing client choice through unrestricted competition for legal services?
Beasley itself held that the terminated partner was entitled to relief despite

his own competition against his firm in recruiting associates for his new
firm, citing cases that relied on the ethical rule favoring competition. 6
The court resolved the conflict among norms in conclusory fashion by
observing that "[i]f Beasley had dirt under his fingernails, CW&T was up

to its' [sic] elbows in the dung heap."" 7
Even assuming that it is clear which norms are the right ones, it is not
clear that they should be enforced by courts."' Justice Cardozo's statement
113. See Dawson, 672 N.E.2d at 591 (quoting Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363
N.E.2d 573, 577 (1977)).
114. Paragraph F of the Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft agreement, which was
attached to the Amended Complaint, provided that voluntarily withdrawing partners were
entitled to their capital shares, not including their interests in accounts receivable or work
inprocess.
115. This rule has been applied in forbidding enforcement of certain types of contractual
constraints on competition by law firms against leaving partners. See Cohen v. Lord, Day
& Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that agreement denying withdrawing
law partner distributions from postdissolution receipts was unethical restriction on competition); Larry E. Ribstein, EthicalRules, Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
116. See Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "Al," 1996 WL
438777, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996) (citing Graubard, Mollen, Danett & Horowitz
v. Moskovitz, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1995) and Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin &
Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992)).
117. Beasley, 1996 WL 438777, at *6.
118. Nor is it clear that the fiduciary norm has been enforced in partnerships under the
UPA. See supra text accompanying note 22. Thus, contrary to the argument in Vestal,
supra note 96, at 511-12, RUPA Section 404(e), which explicitly permits partners to act
selfishly, did not change partnership law. In light of this point, Vestal's argument must be
reformulated as one to change the legal rule in order to better promote a norm that he
believes business people such as the lawyers in Cadwalader are now ignoring.
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in Meinhard, and its repetition in countless later cases, could be no more
than the statement of a standard to which business people should aspire
rather than a legally enforceable rule, 119 or the overstatement of a legal rule

in moralistic terms that promotes compliance."2° The parties to a contractual relationship may subscribe to the norm, but may not want it to be legally enforced."' They may do so for many reasons, including that litigation
is costly and disruptive and relies on facts that are not verifiable."

Indeed,

many recent commentators have argued that legal enforcement may actually
weaken or subvert norms."Z For example, the idea that giving broad legal
remedies to disgruntled or litigious business people necessarily promotes

trust or cooperation in business relationships is absurdly unrealistic.
Instead, it gives some uncooperative parties a club to use against other
uncooperative parties. This could force parties not to trust their associates,

but rather to draft specified agreements that blunt the litigation tool, to
avoid the relationship, or to opt out of the norm altogether, thereby making
it unavailable to govern even the cases for which it was designed. 24 If the
rule is mandatory and the parties cannot avoid its application,"z the parties

119. For an analysis of Delaware management buyout cases that makes this distinction
between legal rules and judicial statements of norms, see EDWARD B. ROCK, SAINTS AND
SINNERS: THE PECULIAR MECHANISMS OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW, (University Of

Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics, Discussion Paper No. 193, Mar. 5, 1996).
120. See Frankel, supra note 6, at 829-32.
121. See ELUCKSON, supra note 101, at 123-36; Macaulay, supra note 101, at 62-67.
122. See Lisa Bernstein, MerchantLaw in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1787-95 (1996).
123. See id. (showing how applying business norms under UCC would perversely affect
commercial relationships); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,
104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 426-46 (1990) (arguing for legal enforcement of nonlegal commitments only in special cases); Langbein, supra note 8, at 658 (noting that although right
behavior may converge with law in cases such as Meinhard, that does not mean that moral
standards always should be legally enforceable); Richard H. Pildes, The Destructionof
Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2060-76 (1996) (showing how law
can destroy social conditions that allow development of norms of reciprocity and cooperation); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 136 (1996) (arguing that rules that
duplicate norms generally undermine self-regulation); Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1913, 1932-38 (1996) (arguing that courts should not enforce norms that are antagonistic to at-will employment).
124. See Bernstein, supra note 122, at 1796-1815. Of course, the law may preclude
this result by making the norm mandatory. However, as discussed in the text immediately
below, this may lead to further problems.
125. See supra Part I.B.
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may be forced to avoid the relationship altogether. A legal rule cannot
force the parties to trust or cooperate with each other, but it can reduce
trust or cooperation.
Even if the norm is appropriate and should be legally enforced, it is
not clear that the norm-based rule should be mandatory, or how broad the
restrictions on contracting should be. For example, the Beasley punitive
damage award was based largely on the absence of an expulsion clause in
the agreement rather than on the general impermissibility of expulsion."
Assuming that there is a "norm" that firms should not expel partners to
save the firm as a whole, it is not clear why all firms should be required to
live by that norm. It is also not obvious why the parties themselves should
not be able to decide when to adopt a legal rule because it may promote
cooperation and trust, and when to reject that rule because it might be used
to promote wasteful litigation. Mandatory fiduciary norms cannot necessarily be justified on externality grounds"z or on the basis of the parties'
limited foresight."
Finally, the supposed "noneconomic" benefits of
mandatory fiduciary duties must be weighed against potential costs, including inhibiting the evolution of new norms, deterring the formation of
potentially beneficial relationships, and frustrating equally strong noneconomic values such as humans' need for autonomy. 129
In short, the "noneconomic" arguments for mandatory fiduciary duties
that have been asserted by anticontractarian commentators are vapid and
unpersuasive. Simply asserting that noneconomic arguments might justify
a different result from "economic" arguments does not eliminate the need
to craft noneconomic arguments that make sense.
G. Alternative Legal Responses
Even if the above arguments against enforcing fiduciary duty waivers
are sound, they must be embodied in a workable rule. The arguments for
nonenforcement, if they are sound at all, apply to so many types of contracts that is difficult to define a logical stopping place for a rule of nonenforcement. This subpart shows that many of the possible rules against
enforcing waivers go beyond any policy arguments for nonenforcement.

126. See Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taf No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
127. See supra text accompanying note 87.
128. See generally Mitchell, supra note 6. This type of argument for mandatory
fiduciary duties is criticized in supra Part II.B.
129. See Burrows, supra note 68, at 490-97.
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1. JudicialDeterminationsof the "Reasonableness"of Waivers
One possible approach to dealing with contracting problems is to let
courts make the decision by enforcing "reasonable" waivers or by adjusting
fiduciary duties to a reasonable level even in the absence of an explicit
waiver. 3 ' This raises the question of how well courts can determine when
fiduciary duty opt-outs should be enforced.'
It is a kind of "nirvana"
fallacy to assume that judicial review of contract enforceability can avoid
the human fallibility that supposedly justifies nonenforcement. In fact, an
external decisionmaker probably cannot do a better job than the contracting
parties in determining the costs and benefits of waiver in particular circumstances. 32
1

First, courts may lack the information necessary to evaluate the costs
and benefits of fiduciary duties. This requires a determination of what
fiduciaries and beneficiaries would get, and have to give up, under various
types of alternative arrangements. Courts must assess the effectiveness of
alternative constraints on fiduciary conduct in light of an intimate knowledge of the elements and surrounding circumstances of the particular
relationship.33 For example, the partnership opportunities duty that is
appropriate to a particular partnership depends on such factors as the value
of the opportunities partners would forgo; the amount of the partners'
financial commitment to the relationship; and the existence of other constraints on the partners' discretion, including their respective ownership
interests in the firm. Courts also must be able to evaluate the waiver in
light of alternative governance structures, including tradeoffs between
voting, exit, and fiduciary duty rules. Many judges, however, lack the
expertise necessary to make such determinations.
Second, a seemingly bad outcome should not be determinative. The
relevant question is how the deal looked at the time the parties made it.
Nevertheless, judges who lack the information and sophistication necessary
to evaluate the costs and benefits as of when the contract was made may fall
130.

One commentator suggests that fiduciary duties should depend on the extent of the

conflict between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, which appears in turn to depend on the
extent to which the parties have contracted for alternative constraints on the fiduciary. See
Dickerson, Looking Glass, supra note 4, at 958-60. Under this approach, the court would,
in effect, supply the waiver it thinks is appropriate based on the other terms of the contract.
131. See generally Davis, supra note 46.
132. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 22-26 (arguing that state should enforce

contracts even when they fail
because contracts are so context-dependent that courts cannot
do better job than parties themselves).
133. Unlike the situation for publicly held firms, courts, like the parties, cannot rely
on an informed efficient market price.
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back on the easier, and wrong, ex post style of decisionmaking. In other
words, they may invalidate waivers that ended up leaving plaintiffs worse
off than they would have been without a waiver (that is, under the default
fiduciary standard).
Third, judges may suffer both from perverse incentives"M and from the
same sort of cognition defects that supposedly cause contracting parties to
make bad deals. 35 Judges who review fiduciary duty waivers suffer from
"sample bias," which may cause them to invalidate an excessive number of
contracts. 36 In order to obtain a realistic view of which agreements they
should not enforce, courts would have to observe the outcomes of the entire
universe of fiduciary duty waivers. With such observations, courts would
see that "bad" cases, in which outcomes are highly favorable for fiduciaries, are simply part of a normal distribution. In other words, courts would
be seeing ex post the distribution of results that the parties expected ex
ante. But courts see only the waiver cases in which beneficiaries are
complaining because the deal turned out well for the fiduciary - as when
the fiduciary turned out to have particularly good outside investment opportunities. This lopsided view suggests that waivers systematically favor
fiduciaries - a view that is conducive to invalidating the agreements. A
judge also may tend to assume that future cases will resemble the case it is
deciding because of the sort of "availability" and "representativeness"
problems identified below-as reasons for not enforcing waivers.13 7 As a
result, a court may be more likely to render a decision that will deter such
bad conduct and may fashion a rule that will guide later cases to similar
results.
2. Unconscionability
Courts could refuse to enforce fiduciary duty waivers as procedurally
or substantively unconscionable. 3 Procedural unconscionability would
require fiduciaries to refrain from undesirable conduct such as physical
duress and would not force courts to review contract terms. 3" This would
134. See supra text accompanying note 100.
135. See supra Part II.C.
136. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 46, at 265 (discussing problem in context of
judicial review of corporate management misconduct).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
138. See Hynes, supra note 3, at 45-46, 52-53. For an excellent analysis of unconscionability, see generally Richard Craswell, PropertyRules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993).
139. See Craswell, supra note 138, at 18 (characterizing procedural unconscionability

FIDUCIARY DUTY CONTRACTS IN UNINCORPORATED FIRMS

567

rarely be a problem for fiduciary duty waivers."' Substantive unconscionability focuses on the egregious unfairness of the terms of the contract. A
detailed application of unconscionability standards to fiduciary duty waivers
is beyond the scope of this Article. The important point for present purposes is that an unconscionability standard has the virtue of integrating
enforceability of fiduciary duty waivers into the general law of contracts.
For this reason, unconscionability may be too narrow a basis of invalidation
to satisfy anticontractarians. "I
3. The "Safe" Partnership
Another possible limitation on waiver would be to restrict enforcement
to firms whose members are least likely to make bad contracts. One writer
argues that general partnerships must offer a safe and "familiar" landscape
for small, more informal firms of relatively unsophisticated people for
whom having to deal with opt-outs would be particularly costly. 42 This

makes some superficial sense because the general partnership is the default
business entity that embraces the least sophisticated firms. Somewhat
inconsistently, the same author notes that the partnership form has been
used by a "dazzling array of relationships"' 43 and that the variability of

partnership has frightened some business people into the less variable
corporate form.'" Perhaps in the future only the more vulnerable "default"
relationships will be channeled into the partnership form while other busias "property" rule that permits parties rather than external decisionmakers to make ultimate
decisions about disposition of property).
140. See Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 669 A.2d 946 (Pa. 1996). In Degenhardt, the court
upheld a partner's assignment to a copartner when the assignor had an opportunity to consult
with legal counsel before entering into the contract, assignee's agents did not subject
individual partner to physical force or unlawful threats, assignor considered the terms for
four days before signing it, and assignor was induced to sign by the expectation of immediate economic gain. Id. at 950-52.
141. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 95 n.65 (asserting that unconscionability is appropriate only for one-shot contracts and not for cooperative relationships). Weidner curiously
supports this assertion by citing the default rule of voidability of interested transactions that
is irrelevant to the issue of whether waivers of the default rule should be enforced. Another
writer suggests that a process-oriented unconscionability rule might trigger preformation
fiduciary duties and make it difficult to determine whether beneficiaries have given enforceable consent to self-dealing. See Vestal, Response, supra note 4, at 73-74. But a duty to
refrain from duress or force is quite different from a preformation fiduciary duty.
142. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 107.
143. Id. at 83.
144. Id. at 102 n.89 (citing Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups,
41 UCLA L. Rv. 1737, 1751-52 (1994)).
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ness forms will become havens of variability and flexibility. As discussed
further below, 45 the idea of the "safe" partnership can be seen as generally
consistent with the contractarian approach, although it may unduly restrict
contracting flexibility.
Another commentator proposes to permit opt-outs in specially designated partnerships. 4 This proposal would let investors choose whether or
not to invest in a protected firm. It is unclear, however, why "irrational"
bargainers should be deemed to be able to make a rational choice of business form if they cannot rationally make other types of deals. At best, this
proposal would mitigate irrationality problems by focusing bargainers'
attention on the risk they face. But it is not clear that this is necessary
because any fiduciary duty waiver is a notorious departure from strong
default fiduciary duties. 47
Finally, if the partnership form, or at least some partnerships, should
be "safe" for the irrational, why should fiduciary duties be the only mandatory rules? Bargainers' cognitive and bargaining defects also could justify
mandatory rules concerning exit, manager compensation, and many other
contract terms.
4. The "EligibleInvestor" Approach
A fourth approach to nonenforcement of waivers would focus on types
of bargainers rather than on types of contracts or firms. Perhaps legislators
should adopt something like the "sophisticated investor" rule that is used for
determining the availability of the private offering exemption under the
Securities Act of 1933.148 Under such a proposal, only certain investors
could choose not to be protected by fiduciary duties, just as only certain
investors can choose not to be protected by the securities laws. But this
sort of bright-line test can be adopted only by regulators or legislators and
not by courts on a case-by-case basis. Notably, no statute has gone this far.
Nor is it clear where the line should be drawn for fiduciary duty waivers for example, whether minimum wealth requirements should be enough or
whether the rule should be based on educational level or business experience.

145. See infra Part Im.E.3.

146. See Vestal, Error,supra note 4, at 578.
147.
148.

See supra note 52.
See Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-

230.508 (1996).
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5. Broad Waivers and "No-Duty" Clauses
A fifth possible approach to nonenforcement would be to focus on the
scope of the waiver, as do the recent uniform laws on partnerships and
limited liability companies. 4 9 The basis of this limitation is that investors
have a particularly hard time foreseeing and evaluating the impact of broad
waivers. 50 However, as already discussed,' the investor irrationality argument, if it applies at all, applies to any contract that will operate into the
future, including a relatively narrow waiver.
Even if broad waivers are enforced, perhaps courts should not enforce
clauses under which a purported fiduciary has no duty at all to his beneficiary. One commentator insists that nonenforcement of such no-duty
partnerships would involve little, if any, cost in terms of barring efficient
contracts. 52 But it is unclear why even such an extreme waiver should
present a particular problem. The parties clearly can enter into relationships, as by taking assignments of partnership interests, 5 1 that entail no
fiduciary duties or indeed any of the management or information rights
associated with partnership. These relationships may be sensible. For one
thing, the costs of going to court over whether a partner has been unduly
selfish or unfair may be very high. For another, it may be more costeffective to substitute for fiduciary duties other constraints on managers'
conduct, such as partners' power to exit the relationship at will through
buyout or dissolution."' 4 For example, if the firm is capitalized on a dealby-deal basis, the nonmanaging investors can leave at any time if they
believe their investment is not paying off. 55 Even if some no-duty relationships are inefficient, the category may be difficult to define. For example,
it may not be clear whether a prohibition on total waivers applies to a nearelimination of duties or to an elimination of most or all remedies.
Across-the-board waivers do raise a potential interpretationproblem.5 6
For example, perhaps it should make a difference whether the parties
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See RUPA § 103(b); ULLCA § 103(b); see also infra Part lII.E.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
See Weidner, supra note 4, at 101-03.
See infra Part III.E.2.
See supra Part I.C.

155. See generally Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967) (considering case
involving this fact situation).
156. See 2 BROrmBERG & RmBSTEN, supra note 22, § 6.07, at 6:91-6:92 (noting that "a

court may interpret an across-the-board waiver strictly and apply even a clear waiver
cautiously").
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contracted for a nonfiduciary relationship or attempted to opt out of all
fiduciary duties in a partnership. Because the parties can enter into relationships that do not entail default fiduciary duties, their decision to form
a partnership arguably indicates that they intended to contract for some
fiduciary duties notwithstanding contrary language in the partnership
agreement. But courts can deal with this sort of question, as they have with
other interpretation issues,1 57 on a case-by-case basis.
11. Legal Supportfor Enforcement of Contracts
Against the significant support for contracting out of fiduciary duties,
the anticontractarians have made conclusory arguments that the law does not
permit such waivers while citing few, if any, supporting cases. The Reporter to RUPA, responding to criticism of RUPA's limitations on waivers,
cites no cases that support these limitations.158 Another commentator cites
three such cases, none of which involve a fiduciary duty waiver." 9
This Part undertakes the careful review of the case law that is lacking
in the anticontractarian commentary. It shows that, far from being the
position of wild-eyed "contractarian extremists,""6 this contractual view of
fiduciary duties is, in fact, nearly universally accepted by state statutes and
courts. In other words, those who seek to change the law through RUPA
and the ULLCA are the "extremists." To reach this conclusion, this Article
relies on the research for Bromberg & Ribstein on Partnership. This
treatise includes at least all partnership cases cited under "Partnership"
keynotes in the West Reporter system after 1965, plus a significant number
of post-1965 cases that are either not in the West system or that do not have
Partnership keynotes. It also includes the substantial research reflected in
the predecessor works, Crane on Partnershipand Crane & Bromberg on
Partnership, for the period prior to 1965. This is the most exhaustive
review of recent partnership case law of which I am aware. Although it
does not purport to reach all relevant cases, the important point is that the
sample is not only large but also unbiased in that there is no reason to
expect that excluded cases would be particularly likely to include cases in
which contracts were not enforced. Although the discussion of specific
157. See infra Part III.B.
158. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 91-92.
159. See Vestal, Response, supra note 4, at 59 n.17 (citing, "e.g.," Appletree, discussed
above; Labovitz v. Dolan, discussed below; and third case, Saballus v. Timke, which applies
default disclosure duty to managing partner, but which does not involve purported waiver
of that duty).
160. See Weidner, supra note 4, at 97.
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cases is selective, it does not omit any cases in the database that might
support the anticontractarian position.
Subparts A and B below discuss the most important issues of the
enforceability of fiduciary duty opt-outs and analogous open-ended contract
terms. Subpart C shows that courts have enforced contracts as written
rather than implicitly invalidating them through restrictive interpretation.
Subpart D carries the discussion into statutory law by analyzing a Delaware
statute that clarifies the enforcement of fiduciary duty waivers. Subpart E
shows that courts and legislatures have respected not only direct waivers,
but also contracts that have the same ultimate effect by determining the
general rules that apply to the parties' relationship. Finally, subpart F
shows the extent to which the recent uniform law proposals depart from the
overwhelming case and statutory law that preceded them.
A. Cases Enforcing FiduciaryDuty Waivers
This subpart discusses cases involving waivers of fiduciary duties that
are entered into in advance of the conduct related to the waiver. The first
five sections discuss cases relating to particular fiduciary duties. They
show that case law overwhelmingly supports enforcement of fiduciary duty
waivers. This is consistent with Section 21 of the UPA, the only provision
' which provides that:
that refers to a partner as a "fiduciary,"161
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. 16
1. Self-Dealing
Partners can contract around the fiduciary's central obligation to act
unselfishly in dealing with the partnership. 63 Such waivers may, among
other things, provide important flexibility to engage in transactions that will
benefit the partnership because the partners themselves are the best sources
for the partnership's labor and materials." 6 Courts have permitted self161. The title of UPA Section 21 is "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary."
162. UPA § 21 (emphasis added).
163. This approach is consistent with analogous authority enforcing contractual authorization of self-dealing by trustees. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 659 (noting and citing
authority for proposition that "the duty of loyalty is default law that yields to contrary terms
of the trust deal").
164. See supra Part I.D. This is recognized explicitly in the UPA and RUPA provisions that one may be a partner even if one also deals with the partnership in another capac-
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dealing even under partnership agreement provisions that only implicitly
waived the duty. Riviera CongressAssociates v. Yassky 16 held that a statement of purpose in a limited partnership prospectus precluded summnary
judgment for the plaintiff on the claim that the partners breached their
fiduciary duty by leasing the partnership motel to their own companies.166
This case shows that partners can waive the duty not to engage in selfdealing even in a limited partnership, in which the separation of ownership
and control makes the duty particularly important. Similarly, Murphy v.
Gutfreund 67 allowed partners to reap substantial profits in a dissolution that
was within their power under the partnership agreement. 68 Adler v. William Blair & Co. 169 held that the general partner in a limited partnership
could invest in property consistent with disclosures in the partnership
agreement that the purpose of the partnership was to invest for capital
appreciation and not primarily for tax losses, that the tax laws might 17be
changed, and that the general partners could have conflicts of interest. 1
And Covalt v. High171 held, again without an explicit waiver, that one of
two partners who was an officer and a shareholder of a partnership's
corporate tenant did not breach a fiduciary duty by refusing to raise the rent
when the partners were aware of the potential conflict from the beginning
of the partnership and both were associated with the corporation. 172
2. Partners'Outside Dealings: Competition and Opportunities
Courts have enforced agreements that allow partners to engage in outside dealings. One of the most important such cases is Singer v. Singer,"7
ity, such as debtor-creditor or employee-employer. See UPA § 7(4); RUPA § 202(c)(3).
It is also implicit in the RUPA provision that "[a] partner may lend money to and transact
other business with the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction the rights and
obligations of the partner are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to
other applicable law." Id. § 404(f).
165. 223 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1966).
166. See Hynes, supra note 3, at 42-43 (discussing Yassky).
167. 583 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
168. Murphy v. Gutfreund, 583 F. Supp. 957, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
169. 613 N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
170. Notably, this case distinguished and limited the Labovitz case, showcased in the
comments to RUPA as a leading case for the anticontractarian position. See infra text
accompanying notes 212-17 (discussing Labovitz).
171. 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. App. Ct. 1983).
172. Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999, 1000 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
173. 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). This case is discussed in Hynes, supra note
3, at 41-42. For another important and recent case supporting fiduciary duty waivers in
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which permitted a partner in an oil production partnership to purchase land
within the area of the partnership's interest under the following provision:
Each partner shall be free to enter into business and other transactions for
his or her own separate individual account, even though such business or
other transaction may be in conflict with and/or competition with the
business of the partnership. Neither the partnership nor any individual
member of this partnership shall be entitled to claim or receive any part
of or interest in such transactions, it being the intention and agreement
that any partner will be free to deal on his or her own account to the
same extent and with the same force and effect as if he or she were not
and never had been members of this partnership. 174
Similarly, Singer v. Scher" s enforced an oral agreement that permitted
law partners to keep profits from investment opportunities derived from
clients, including stock options.176 And in Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel
Hill Gardens, Inc.,"7 the court held that a joint venturer (which the court
treated as a partner) had no fiduciary duty except with respect to the
specific joint venture property, and therefore could pursue other ventures
under an agreement that both limited the scope of the venture to the purchase and development of specific property and permitted the venturers to
engage in other opportunities.178
partnerships, see U.S. West, Inc. v. Tme WarnerInc., 1996 WL 307445 (Del. Ch. June 6,
1996) (interpreting noncompetition provision in joint venture agreement as allowing joint
venturer to buy company, although this would place it in competition with plaintiff in way
that had not been contemplated at time of agreement, and holding that purchase would not
violate venturer's fiduciary duties). Chancellor Allen stated: "Certainly partnerships are
amenable to greater freedom contractually to shape the set of legal relationships that
constitute the partnership than are corporations, and this freedom may include clear contracting with respect to fiduciary duties." Id. at *22.
174. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 768 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
175. 761 F. Supp. 145 (D.D.C. 1991).
176. Singer v. Scher, 761 F. Supp. 145, 150 (D.D.C. 1991).
177. 654 N.E.2d 501 (11. App. Ct. 1995).
178. Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 501, 505 (111. App.
Ct. 1995). The agreement provided in part:
[Nothing herein contained shall be construed to constitute any Joint Venturer
the agent of any other Joint Venturer or to limit in any manner any Joint Venturer in carrying on of its own respective business or activities .... Any Joint

Venturer may engage in and/or possess any interest in other business and real
estate ventures of any nature or description, independently or with others,
including, but not limited to, the ownership, management, operation, financing,
leasing, syndication, brokerage, and development of real property; and neither
the Joint Venture nor any Joint Venturer, by reason of this Agreement or
by reason of holding an interest in this Joint Venture, shall have any right or
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Several cases have reached similar results even in the absence of
explicit fiduciary duty waivers by holding that partners could engage in
opportunities on their own behalf that were outside the scope of the partner-

ship defined in the partnership agreement. 179 Courts have done so even
when the opportunity involved land adjacent to the specific property the

partnership was created to develop." 8
The agreement may limit the venture in time as well as in geographic
scope.

Courts have interpreted relationships as involving sequences of

separate ventures, so that partners could acquire related ventures. 8 ' Other
cases have held that a partner's fiduciary duty regarding opportunities did
not extend beyond dissolution of the venture." These cases should be
contrasted with Meinhard v. Salmon," which held that a nonmanaging
partner was entitled to share in a deal offered to the partnership by the
party for whom the partnership had managed the property.' 4 In contrast
to Justice Cardozo's famous language suggesting an absolute duty,"r the
interest in or to any such independent venture or the income or profits derived
therefrom.
Id.
179. See Mathis v. Meyeres, 574 P.2d 447, 449 (Alaska 1978); Lipinski v. Lipinski,
35 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. 1949); Smith v. Bolin, 271 S.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Tex. 1954);
Warner v. Winn, 197 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tex. 1946); Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393,
399 (Tex. App. 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); 2 BROMBERG & RIBSrEIN, supra note 22, § 6.07,
at 6:79-:80 n.44-46; see also Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d
1183, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that joint venturers do not owe fiduciary duty beyond
express terms of partnership agreement); cf. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 900 n.1 (2d Cir.
1967) (permitting manager of real estate investment partnership to take some opportunities
for himself when firm's minimal capitalization indicated limited scope of venture); Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Tex. 1976) (holding that managing partner could
not take for own benefit opportunity that fell within partnership business as described in
partnership agreement).
180. See Mathis, 574 P.2d at 449; Lipinski, 35 N.W.2d at 713.
181. See Menos v. Hodges, 499 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Mo. 1973) (permitting partner to
buy nursing home for himself when partnership had acquired series of nursing homes). In
Burg, 380 F.2d at 900 & n.1, the firm's minimal capitalization suggests that it was actually
a series of related ventures funded on a deal-by-deal basis.
182. Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tenn. 1979), noted in 11 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 143, 144 (1980); Mathis v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 430 S.W.2d 78, 83-84 (Tex. App.
1968, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that partner who worked with copartner on accommodation
for third party in hope of receiving additional business from third party was not entitled to
deal offered to copartner after dissolution).
183. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
184. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
185. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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case actually turns on the parties' expectations. In particular, the parties'
twenty-year relationship arguably made the scope of this venture broader
than that of the usual joint venture, and the fact that the disputed opportunity included the property that the partnership had managed supported
bringing the new opportunity into the scope of the partnership. Thus,
Justice Cardozo himself acknowledged that he would bend his "uncompromising rigidity" in the face of different facts:
If Salmon had received from Gerry a proposition to lease a building at a
location far removed, he might have held for himself the privilege thus
acquired, or so we shall assume. Here the subject-matter of the new lease
was an extension and enlargement of the subject-matter of the old one."8
3. Compensation
Courts enforce contracts that waive the default partnership rule against
compensating partners for acting in the course of the partnership business . 187 To be sure, an agreement to pay specific compensation differs
from a waiver of liability for future conduct. But permitting a partner to
pay himself unspecified amounts in the future is very much like compensating the partner by allowing him to engage in other forms of self-interested
conduct. 88 Thus, a case holding that a compensation provision in the
partnership agreement prevents such compensation from being a breach of
fiduciary duty189 could apply equally to a fiduciary duty waiver.

4. The Duty to Disclose
Unlike the general fiduciary duty under Section 21 of the UPA, the
duty to disclose under Section 20 of the UPA is not explicitly subject to the
partners' contrary agreement."9 One might argue that disclosure is so basic
186. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548. Even under the facts in the case, Judge Andrews
would have held that this was not a partnership opportunity. Id. at 552 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
187. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, supra note 22, § 6.07, at 6:91 n.92.
188. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 37, at 471 (characterizing compensation of
general partners in venture capital partnerships as consisting of both monetary compensation
and ability to "receive private benefits from certain activities," and discussing why managers
may seek to be compensated through reduced restrictions on their private gains rather than
by higher percentage of firm's income).
189. See Wilson v. Button, 404 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding that partner's
payment to himself of reasonable salary was not breach of fiduciary duty because partners
had agreed to salary arrangement).
190. Compare UPA § 20, with id. § 21.
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a right that the parties should not be able easily to waive it. There is some
dicta to the effect that disclosure duties cannot be waived. In Appletree
Square I Limited Partnershipv. Investmark, Inc. ,' the court held that a
partnership agreement requiring the general partners to "provide the partners with all information that may reasonably be requested" did not protect
the partners from liability for failure to disclose asbestos contamination in
the partnership's building." 9 The court reasoned that a contract provision
that relieved the defendant of the duty to disclose was against public policy
in this setting because its major purpose was to shield wrongdoers from
liability.1" Notably, however, the agreement did not waive the defendant's
disclosure duty, but rather stated an affirmative obligation to disclose.
Another case with dictum supporting mandatory disclosure duties is
Marsh v. Gentry,"9 in which the defendant-partner argued that his copartner's awareness of a custom of secret bidding by co-owners of horses
authorized the defendant to withhold the information that he had secretly
bid for and purchased horses owned by the partnership." 9 The court held
that no such practice was established, but also stated that any such practice
could not override the defendant's legal obligation to disclose." 9
No court has held that an agreement waiving disclosure duties is
unenforceable. To the contrary, there is explicit authority supporting
enforcement of such an agreement. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin98 held that a
limited partnership agreement could restrict limited partners' access to, and
general partners' duty to disclose, confidential information regarding oil
leases. ' The court reasoned that the agreement permitted limited partners
to compete with the partnership, that the limited partners were highly
191. 494 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
192. Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 893
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
193. Id.
194. Id. The case is perhaps more remarkable in expanding the default duty under the
UPA to "render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership."
UPA § 20 (emphasis added). This can be explained by the fact that the defendants were the
builders and sellers of the building. Thus, the case holds only that a builder or a seller cannot
be exonerated from a common-law duty to disclose a building's hazard to a buyer merely
because the seller also happens to hold an interest in the purchasing partnership and the
partnership agreement happens to provide for an obligation to disclose information when asked.
Appletree SquareI Ltd. Partnership,494 N.W.2d at 892.
195. 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982).
196. Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1982).
197. Id.
198. 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
199. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (5th Cir. 1993).
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sophisticated, represented by counsel, compensated for relinquishing the
disclosure right, and could have obtained an independent evaluation or
rejected the offer.' Although the case leaves open the possibility that a
broader waiver of the disclosure duty, or one by less sophisticated partners,
might not be enforced, it clearly recognizes the principle that the partners
may contract regarding disclosure.
5. Remedies
The partners may waive not only fiduciary duties, but also the traditional means of enforcing such duties - the right to an accounting under
the UPA. ° Lenz v. Associated Inns & Restaurants Co. of America'
enforced an agreement that explicitly waived partners' rights to an accounting. 3 The court relied on authorities, including Singer v. Singer,' 4 that
enforced waivers of substantive duties.' Other courts have held that the
partnership agreement may provide a substitute for the statutory accounting
remedy, 206 and that an agreement may provide for expulsion of a partner
who contests a general partner's management decision.' Courts also have
enforced quite generally and broadly arbitration provisions in partnership
agreements. 2°8 This type of agreement has been endorsed even by anticontractarians, usually on the basis that it substitutes rather than eliminates
remedies.'
But this is not essentially different from substituting other
constraints on fiduciaries for fiduciary duties.
B. InterpretationIssues
In order to evaluate supposed case law support for the anticontractarians' position, it is necessary to analyze cases that sometimes involve strong
200. Id.
201. See UPA § 28.
202. 833 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
203. Lenz v. Associated Inns & Restaurants Co. of America, 833 F. Supp. 362, 383-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1993)
204. 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); see supra text accompanying note 173.
205. Lenz, 833 F. Supp. at 383-84.
206. Raymond v. Brimberg, 473 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (1984).
207. McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 675-77 (Tex. App. 1993, reh'g writ
overuled). The court noted that the provision did not authorize self-dealing in violation of
"public policy" or provide for reallocation of expelled partner's interest solely to managers,
although it is unclear under what circumstances the court would have refused to enforce the
expulsion.

208. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, § 6.08, at 6:119-6:122.
209. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 6, at 953-74; Thompson, supra note 6, at 395;
Weidner, supra note 4, at 94.
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language against waivability. This subpart shows that, when the cases are
so analyzed, they do not actually hold that waivers are unenforceable.
Instead, they either did not involve waivers at all or involved conduct that
fell outside the waiver. Although judges might use the language of mandatory rules, this language is not law. For example, a court's opinion on the
scope of fiduciary duties in a case in which fiduciary duties were not
waived has no precedential value in a case in which they were. The traditional legal approach to dicta is amply justified because judges often do not
intend dicta to be taken as law210 and because judges' discretion is more
constrained in making decisions than in stating dicta.2" Section 3 theorizes
about a potential third category of cases in which the courts might use
"good faith" to end-run fiduciary duty waivers.
1. FiduciaryDuties in the Exercise of Power UnderAgreement
Several cases hold that partners had fiduciary duties despite broad
delegations of power to partners under agreements that did not contain
fiduciary duty waivers. Apart from dicta in some of these cases stating that
fiduciary duties may not be waived, most of the cases are unremarkable
because an agreement that delegates power over a beneficiary's property is
precisely the situation in which one would expect default fiduciary duties
to apply. Thus, in Labovitz v. Dolan,"' the lone case for nonwaivability
cited in the Official Comment to RUPA Section 103, the court held that a
provision in the partnership agreement giving the general partner discretion
over distributions did not authorize him to breach his fiduciary duty by
withholding distributions in order to squeeze out the limited partners.
Because the agreement did not include a fiduciary duty waiver, the case
210. See supranote 119 and accompanying text.
211. Courts may use the sort of language that will win fame by being cited in later
decisions. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 132 (1990) (contending that Judge Cardozo sought to increase his reputation with legal academics); Richard
A. Epstein, The Independence ofJudges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory,
1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 837. See generally BRUCE H. KoBAYAsHI & JOHN R. LOTr, JR.,
JUDICIAL REPUTATION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMON LAW (1994). Or courts may
simply wish to express their opinions, like other observers and voters. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-44 (1995). But courts' decisions are constrained by
competition from arbitrators and other dispute resolvers as well as by the possibility of
reversal by appellate courts. See Paul H. Rubin & Joel L. Schrag, JudicialHierarchiesand
the Rule-Individual Tradeoff (Feb. 6, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
On this analysis, judges' decisions should be taken more seriously than their language.
212. 545 N.E.2d 304 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
213. Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 313 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
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holds only that generally empowering a partner to engage in a particular
21 4
activity does authorize the partner to squeeze out the other partners.
Indeed, the dictum is not much stronger. The court says that "the fiduciary
duty exists concurrently with the obligations set forth in the partnership
agreement whether or not expressed therein."2 5 This means only that
default fiduciary duties exist even if they are not stated in the agreement.
The court also said that partners "are not free to destroy [the partnership's]
fiduciary character."2"6 This is different from saying that the partners may
not contract to enforce fiduciary obligations other than through legal fiduciary duties and remedies. Consistent with this analysis, Labovitz was later
distinguished as a squeezeout case by appellate opinions in the same state
that upheld partners' self-interested actions in accordance with authorizations in the partnership agreements.2 7
Other cases that, like Labovitz, include strong dicta about fiduciary
duties hold only that a partnership agreement's delegation of power does
not, in the absence of a waiver, authorize the empowered partners to breach
their default fiduciary duties. Palmisano v. Mascaro1 8 held that a partner
was subject to fiduciary duties under an agreement which provided that the
partner would not be liable for acts within the scope of his authority unless
the acts were misfeasance or malfeasance; authorized him to sell partnership
property on such terms as he in his sole and uncontrolled discretion deemed
necessary, advisable, or proper; and required the partner to act as a fiduciary and prudent administrator.2 9 Although the court stated that the
parties could not contract around fiduciary duties provided for in the
Louisiana statute, this statement was only dictum in the absence of such a
contract. Knopke v. Knopke - held that the general partner had a fiduciary
duty to deal prudently and honestly with the partnership and other partners
214. See Deborah A. DeMott, FiduciaryPreludes:Likely Issuesfor LLCs, 66 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1043, 1045-49 (1995) (suggesting that courts will apply good faith limit on
fiduciaries' exercise of discretion under general discretionary power like that in Labovitz).
However, as indicated in the text, it is not necessary to resort to a good faith analysis. The
conduct is clearly covered by a default fiduciary duty in the absence of a waiver.
215. Labovitz, 545 N.E.2d at 313.
216. Id.
217. See Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 501 (I1. App.
Ct. 1995); Adler v. William Blair & Co., 613 N.E.2d 1264 (111.App. Ct. 1993); see also
supra notes 169-70 (discussing Adler); supra notes 177-78 (discussing Dremco). Justice
Scariano, the author of Labovitz, concurred in Dremco.
218. 611 So. 2d 632 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
219. Palmisano v. Mascaro, 611 So. 2d 632, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
220. 837 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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and, within the bounds of discretion, to invest surplus partnership funds to
make a reasonable return under a limited partnership agreement that gave
general partners in a limited partnership the "unqualified authority" to make
all decisions relating to the financial affairs of the partnership. 1 Again,
the case involved no explicit fiduciary duty waiver. Jerman v. O'Leary'm
held that a general partner breached his fiduciary duty by acquiring property at a below-market price without full disclosure although the partnership
agreement authorized the partner to acquire property from the partnership.' Once again, the agreement did not waive the partners' fiduciary
duties.
The most extensive opinion in the group, Konover Development Corp.
v. Zeller' 4 held that, although the limited partnership agreement permitted
the general partner to withdraw and demand payment for development expenses if it decided in its sole discretion that the project was not feasible, it
was error to instruct the jury that the general partner's decision would be
The court reasoned that the partner's decision was
upheld if reasonable.
subject to a fiduciary duty of fairness to the limited partner that was shaped
by several factors, including the limited partner's sophistication, the relative
bargaining power among the parties, disclosure, and the adequacy of consideration.' The court noted the general partner's need for flexibility and
the risk that the limited partner could hold the general partner "hostage" in
the partnership. 7 Like the cases discussed above, the case did not involve
an explicit fiduciary duty waiver. Moreover, rather than saying that fiduciary duties were absolute, the court emphasized the flexibility of fiduciary
duties 8and the need to adapt them to the particular circumstances of the
case. =

The only questionable decisions in this category are those in which a
court might have inferred, but did not infer, a fiduciary duty waiver from
the circumstances of the agreement, as other cases have done.9 In particular, Starr v. Fordham" held that law partners with the power to determine
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Knopke v. Knopke, 837 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
701 P.2d 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
635 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1994).
Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 805 (Conn. 1994).

226. Id. at 807-09.
227. Id. at 809.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 806.
See supra Part III.A.1.
648 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995).
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the payout to a withdrawing partner under a partnership agreement had to
prove that the price was fair."3 Unlike the other decisions in this group,
the plaintiff in Starr knew that the managing partners would have a conflict
of interest in making the precise compensation decision that the agreement
empowered them to make.' 2 Thus, the court might have inferred plaintiff's
consent to a conflict that was, in effect, "embedded" in the relationship to
which he had explicitly consented. 3 To be sure, the plaintiff might have
expected fiduciary duties to apply to the managers' determination of his exit
compensation.'
Nevertheless, the parties might explicitly have agreed to
forgo costly enforcement of fiduciary duties. 35 In any event, the court
probably was persuaded not to imply a waiver because the managing
partners had misrepresented to the plaintiff how they planned to determine
his compensation. 6
2. The Limits of FiduciaryDuty Waivers
This section discusses interpretations of agreements that include fiduciary duty waivers, but which courts have interpreted as not exonerating the
disputed conduct. Although the cases involve attempted waiver, they are
not authority against enforcement of fiduciary duty waivers. Rather, the
cases merely involve judicial determinations that the conduct was not within
the waiver and therefore was subject to default fiduciary duties. For
example, a provision that permits partners to engage in outside business
does not authorize the partners to use this power to, in effect, steal the
231. Starr v.Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Mass. 1995). For a similar case, see
Smith v. Brown & Jones, 633 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (relying on Starr and holding
that partners engaged in self-dealing by setting artificially low buyout price).
232. Starr, 648 N.E.2d at 1264.
233. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 665-66 (arguing that conflicts that are embedded
in nature of transaction should not be rigidly enforced). For a case in which a court did not
enforce such an "embedded" conflict, see Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983). See also supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (discussing Covalt).
234. The plaintiff might have been foolhardy to trust the managers in this situation
because their selfishness would be unconstrained by other considerations, such as a desire
to retain the plaintiff's services. This contrasts with the "embedded" conflicts discussed by
Langbein in which the trustee's self-dealing may at least be in the settlor's interests, which
was arguably the case with Mark Rothko's executors' disposition of Rothko's trust property.
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 665-66 (discussing In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.
1977).
235. See supra Part I.D.
236. Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Mass. 1995). It is not clear that the
plaintiff was entitled to rely on this representation in light of the unrestricted delegation of
power in the partnership agreement.
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partnership. Thus, Wartski v. Bedford

7

held that a partner's purchase of

a related company critical to the partnership for a total of $10 was not
within a general clause in the partnership agreement authorizing the partners
to compete. 8 Accordingly, the court's statement that the parties could not
wholly negate their fiduciary duties 9 was only dictum. Similarly, Lyall v.
Grayco Builders, Inc . ' held that a partnership agreement that authorized
a partner to work on other projects independently did not give him the right
to deprive a copartner of his partnership interest by essentially undercutting
the partnership's business." Nor does a partnership agreement that authorizes competition extend to the use of partnership property or information
or to misrepresentations. Thus, Tn-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf,
237. 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991).
238. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). The clause provided:
"General partners shall not be prevented from engaging in other activities for profit, whether
in research and development or otherwise, and whether or not competitive with the business
of the partnership." Id. at 20.
239. Id. at 19-20.
240. 584 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
241. Lyall v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 465, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1992). An
additional case, Froemming v. Gate City FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n, 822 F.2d 723 (8th
Cir. 1986), held that fiduciary duties applied to a partner's self-dealing despite an agreement
that permitted partners to benefit from partnership contracts if they were disclosed prior to
the transaction. Id. at 731. It is unclear whether this case refused to enforce the waiver or
found conduct outside of it because the court barely discussed the issue. The partnership
agreement provided:
8.07: Conflicts of Interest. It is expressly agreed and acknowledged that each of
the Partners may engage in, acquire and possess, without limitation or accountability to any of the other Partners, any and all business ventures, professions,
callings, pursuits, investments and interests of every nature and description,
independently or with others, including, but not limited to, any interest or
investment similar to the Partnership property; and it is understood that any
Partner may benefit directly or indirectly by virtue of any contract or agreement
which the Partnership may enter with any other person or entity in which a
Partner may have a direct or indirect interest. However, in the event that a
Partner will receive a direct or indirect benefit by virtue of any contract or
agreement which the Partnership may enter into, the Partner shall have a duty to
disclose such direct or indirect benefit or interest to the Partnership before the
Partnership enters into the contract or agreement.
Id. at 731 n. 11. The court cryptically added, as its sole discussion of the issue:
The district court evidently concluded that this provision did not relieve the North
Dakota partners of their fiduciary duties in disposing of the mall. We see no
error in this conclusion as this paragraph does not explicitly reach the question
of what duties the partners owe one another in dealing with partnership property.
Id. at 731.
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Burdmnan, Duignan & Eisenberg242 held that a contract authorizing partners

to compete with the partnership did not permit a partner to use against the
partnership inside information that the partnership would not be able to
close the deal soon and did not permit the partner to mislead the seller into
thinking that the partnership would refuse to buy the property.243
3. "Good Faith"

One commentator suggests that courts might, in effect, eviscerate
fiduciary duty waivers by applying a robust good faith duty notwithstanding
the waiver.' Properly construed, however, good faith in partnerships
differs from fiduciary duties.245 Fiduciary duties normally are specifically

associated with constraints on power delegated to managers. By contrast,
good faith is a general principle of interpreting contracts that conserves
drafting costs by precluding parties from acting opportunistically according
to the letter, but contrary to the spirit, of the contract. 2' In a partnership,
242. 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Ct. App. 1989).
243. Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265
Cal. Rptr. 330, 336 (Ct. App. 1989).
244. See DeMott, supra note 214, at 1057-62. For commentary asserting a similarity
between good faith and fiduciary duties, see Dickerson, supra note 4, at 978-93; Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supranote 5, at 429-40.
245. This is supported by the separation of good faith and fiduciary duties in RUPA
Section 404. However, Section 404(d) and Section 103(b)(5) of RUPA are inconsistent with
the definition of good faith proposed here because these provisions identify good faith as a
distinct obligation rather than as a means of applying the obligations provided for in the
contract.
246. See Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon Ltd. Partnership,
840 F. Supp. 770, 776-78 (D. Or. 1993). The court said:
If in each contract the parties had to expressly describe and prohibit every artifice
by which the parties could potentially deprive each other of the fruits of their
agreement, then contracts would soon become as long as the tax code, as difficult
to interpret, and (like the tax code) still contain innumerable loopholes available
to a party that wished to avoid the spirit of its bargain. The better approach...
is to treat a contract for what it is - an exchange of solemn promises - and
enforce the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties. The transaction
in question here is an artifice intended to thwart plaintiff's legitimate contractual
expectation that it would have a right of first refusal before the partnership
interest owned by CRCO could be transferred to someone outside the Cellular
family of companies. As such, the Purchase Agreement violates the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that Oregon law implies in every contract .... [The
doctrine of good faith is not a new material term created by the court, but rather
a term implied by law in every contract to give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties that were created by the language of their contract.
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the contract includes the default rules of partnership, which courts should
apply in an internally consistent way. For example, unless otherwise
agreed, partners share partnership property equally 7 and may not use this
property for personal purposes.' At the same time, partners have a default
power to withdraw and cause a liquidation of the partnership at any time.
A partner has a good faith duty not to use this power to usurp partnership
property rights inconsistently with the other terms of the partnership contract.24 9 By the same token, the fiduciary duty waiver would be one of the

partnership terms to which courts must give independent effect in interpreting the partnership agreement under a "good faith" analysis.
C. PreformationDuties
Under the anticontractarian approach to fiduciary duties, certain
immutable rules apply irrespective of contract. It follows logically from
this theory that fiduciary duties could be imposed on the parties even if they
have not contractually elected to be subject to a fiduciary relationship. By
contrast, the contractarian approach to fiduciary duties implies that, just as
the parties can waive default duties that otherwise would be associated with
a particular type of relationship, they also should be able to avoid contracting into a fiduciary relationship. Moreover, the same policy considerations
that favor permitting the parties to vary default duties also justify refusing
to recognize fiduciary duties prior to contracting. The appropriate scope
of fiduciary duties necessarily depends on the other terms of the parties'
contract, particularly including exit, governance, and other constraints on
managerial conduct.' In the precontractual period, the parties by definition have not agreed on these other terms. Thus, it is unclear precisely
what duties should apply. For example, it is not clear what the scope of
the parties' duties regarding partnership opportunities should be until the
parties agree on how much managerial power to delegate, what the parties'
outside opportunities are, and what other monitoring devices will control
managerial misconduct. As a result, courts would have to apply a fiduciary
duty that did not necessarily fit the particular relationship. This view would
force parties to engage in customized contracting, complete with lawyers,
at the outset of negotiations rather than when they are finalizing their deal.
Moreover, preformation duties would be difficult to waive. Although the
247. See UPA § 18(a); RUPA § 401(a).
248. See UPA § 25(2)(a).
249. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 45 (Cal. 1961) (stating in dictum that partner may
not appropriate business after dissolution without adequate compensation to copartner).
250. See supra Part I.A.
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partners could agree in the partnership agreement that results from the
negotiations that no fiduciary duties arose prior to the date of the agree-

ment, this tactic will not work if the negotiations break down prior to an
agreement or if the court holds that this provision is itself vitiated by pre-

agreement nondisclosure."
The contractarian approach

duty -

-

that is, no preformation fiduciary

is supported by several cases.'

As the court said in Phoenix

Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shady Grove Plaza Ltd. ,

"[a] fiduciary rela-

tionship hardly arises when commercial parties engage in contract negotiations." 4 Although the UPA provides that a partner must account for
profits "from any transaction connected with the formation of the partnership, "I this arguably refers to formation of the partnership business in the
sense of setting up the physical apparatus and contracts with third parties
following the partners' reaching agreement on the terms of their relationship.56 This view would be consistent with the contract analysis of preformation duties. RUPA deletes the confusing reference to duties in formation . 7

251. On the other hand, under a no-duty default rule the parties could affirmatively
contract, as through a binding "letter of intent," for specific duties during the preformation
period. C. Newharbor Partners, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 961 F.2d 294, 299-300 (1st Cir.
1992) (holding that letter of intent proposing real estate venture, which created some obligations but stated that it did not create legally binding obligations in other respects, did not
create mutually intended obligation to act in good faith). The parties could use this device
in the relatively infrequent situations in which preformation duties are appropriate, when the
parties' negotiations have reached the point that it is less costly for them to rely on legal
sanctions than to actively monitor and investigate their potential copartners.
252. See Jordan v. McDonald, 803 F. Supp. 493, 496-98 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that
under Massachusetts law, plaintiff was not entitled to treble damages under fraud statute
based on fraudulent inducement of her purchase of limited partnership interest because
prior to purchase general partner owed no partnership duty to plaintiff); Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Shady Grove Plaza Ltd., 734 F. Supp. 1181, 1191-92 (D. Md. 1990)
(holding that there were no good faith or fiduciary duties during negotiations), aff'd, 937
F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1991); Waite ex reL Bretton Woods Acquisition Co. v. Sylvester, 560
A.2d 619, 624-26 (N.H. 1989) (stating that UPA Section 21 does not impose fiduciary
duty among prospective partners dealing at arm's length during formation negotiations,
here concerning valuation of property transferred by partnership to prospective partner).
253. 734 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1990).
254. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 734 F. Supp. at 1192.
255. UPA § 21 (emphasis added).
256. But see Vestal, Error,supra note 4, at 565-67 (arguing that there are preformation
duties under UPA).
257. See RUPA § 404.
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Several cases state, but do not hold, that fiduciary duties arise during
preformation negotiations. These cases fall into three general categories.
First, some cases involve affirmative misrepresentations as distinguished
from failures to disclose. 8 Permitting lies would force contracting parties
to take costly self-protective actions to investigate statements, whereas

requiring parties not to lie does not impose significant burdens on contract
negotiators. Accordingly, the duty to refrain from intentional lies is an
efficient default rule. By contrast, a general duty to disclose information
would be potentially open-ended and would raise the same problems as

imposing other preformation fiduciary duties. Second, some of the dicta
supporting preformation duties concerns postformation conduct made
wrongful by preformation statements or promises. 9 This is nothing more
than using the preformation statements to define a contractual duty that does

not arise until after the parties form their relationship. Third, there is
misleading dicta concerning duties that arise after formation by reason of
an enforceable agreement.'

Fiduciary duties should arise as soon as the

parties agree to be governed by a specific set of rules, even if this agreement is preliminary in form - that is, is embodied in a "letter of intent" or
similar instrument. In light of the above analysis, the question should be
whether the relationship has been sufficiently determined that courts and the
parties can know what fiduciary duties should apply and the parties are in
a position to enter into a customized contract regarding such duties.

258. See Knapp v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 154 F.2d 395, 396-99 (10th
Cir. 1946) (plaintiff allegedly induced to join partnership by fraudulent representations);
Lucas v. Abbott, 601 P.2d 1376, 1376 (Colo. 1979) (joint venturer misrepresented his
financial condition with misleading balance sheet); Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876, 878
(Md. 1972) (purchasing partners misrepresented to plaintiff price they would be paying for
deceased partner's interest, portion of which they resold to plaintiff); R.C. Gluck & Co. v.
Tankel, 199 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14-17 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (partner misrepresented value of property
he sold to partnership), aff'd, 199 N.Y.S.2d 602 (App. Div. 1961); see also Elk River
Assocs. v. Huskin, 691 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (cause of action for
prospectus misrepresentation governed by statute of limitations applicable to confidential
relationships).
259. See Tobias v. First City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 709 F. Supp. 1266, 1277-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (general partner can be held liable under New York law for breach of
fiduciary duty for taking or failing to take actions that violated representations made prior
to purchase of limited partnership interests during time partnership was in existence);
Allen v. Steinberg, 223 A.2d 240, 242-48 (Md. 1965) (involving misconduct during partnership).
260. See Maykus v. First City Realty & Fin. Corp., 518 S.W.2d 887, 892-93 (Tex.
App. 1974) (discussing duties created by letter of intent that was held to create contractual
relationship).
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D. A Statutory Approach: The Delaware Law
Delaware has clarified enforceability of waivers by enacting the following provision:
(c) It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle
of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner has duties (including
fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited partnership or
to another partner, (1) any such partner acting under a partnership agreement shall not be liable to the limited partnership or to any such other
partner for the partner's good faith reliance on the provisions of such
partnership agreement, and (2) the partner's duties and liabilities may be
expanded or restricted by provisions in a partnership agreement. 1
Arguably, this provision explicitly authorizes only agreements that expand
or restrict, rather than eliminate, fiduciary duties.62 However, this interpretation would ignore the expansive authorization of contracts in subsection (c). Nor is it likely that the statute will be undermined by an expansive
application of "good faith" principles, as one commentator has predicted.6 3
An important, recent case appears to favor a literal interpretation of the
statute. In U.S. Cellular Investment Co. of Allentown v. Bell Atlantic
Mobile Systems, Inc.,' the Delaware Supreme Court held that a complaint
alleging the defendant's intentional failure to share certain rights with the
plaintiff did not sufficiently plead .a breach of fiduciary duty under the
above provision because it did not assert a "knowing breach of the agreement. "I
261. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (1992). The quoted language is from the limited
partnership provision. The counterpart LLC provision is similar. See id. § 18-1101. For
discussions of this provision, see Hynes, supra note 3, at 49-50, and see generally Larry E.
Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the DelawareLimited Partnershipand Its Implicationsfor
CorporateLaw, 16 J. CORP. L. 299 (1991).
262. See DeMott, supranote 214, at 1057.

263. See id. at 1057-62.
264. 677 A.2d 497 (Del. 1996).
265. U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. of Allentown v. Bell Atlantic Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d

497, 504 (Del. 1996). For additional cases supporting a broad interpretation of the Delaware
provision, see Whalen v. Conne/ly, 545 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1996) (relying on Delaware statute
and holding that it was not breach as matter of law for general partner or its affiliate to
engage in riverboat gambling projects in other states without offering limited partner opportu-

nity to participate because partnership agreement permitted general partners to engage in other
similar activities), and Rothmeier v. InvestmentAdvisers, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that, under Delaware statute, partnership may terminate partner in
compliance with partnership agreement in absence of evidence that partner's investigation of
firm's securities registration was improper motivating factor in his termination).
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E. Indirect Waiver: Selecting the Default Rules
Consistent with the contractual theory, the parties not only can directly
choose to waive fiduciary duties, but also can do so indirectly by choosing
the applicable state law, one of several standard forms offered by each
state, and what their status will be within a given standard form.

1. Choice of Applicable State Law
The parties have long been able to designate the applicable state law
in their partnership agreement. Because the UPA does not include a choice
of law provision, general common-law rules on choice of law apply to
general partnerships. Under these rules, a contractual choice of law clause
may not be enforced with respect to the validity of a contractual provision
such as a fiduciary duty waiver if (a) the chosen state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable

basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen
state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state that has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and that, under the rule of Section 188 of the Restatement (Second)

of Conflict ofLaws, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence
of an effective choice of law by the parties.'

Despite the application of these general rules, courts have almost invariably applied contractual choice of law to partnerships. 267 In one recent
266.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 187(2) (1971).

267. See Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1298 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that
clause in partnership agreement which applied Alaska law was enforceable when oil leases,
subject of partnership, were located in Alaska although Settlement Agreement was predominately negotiated, drafted, and executed in Texas and partnership involved several Texas
companies); Great Lakes Overseas, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group, Ltd., 990 F.2d 990,
994 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying English law as selected in parties' agreement to determine if
freight liner service and corporation were partners); Spitzer v. Shanley Corp., 870 F. Supp.
565, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that Oklahoma law governed fiduciary duty of corporate
general partner although that partner was incorporated in Texas); Ryan v. Brophy, 755 F.
Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that New York law governed suit by former
partnership employee against principal members of partnership when employment contract
forming basis of employee's claims provided for application of New York law, partners were
citizens of New York, and partnership had its principal place of business in New York);
Seidman & Seidman v. Wolfson, 123 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that choice
of law provision was properly enforced below and reasoning that fraud which vitiates contractual choice of law clause must be in connection with clause itselt; Crowe v. Smith, 603
So. 2d 301, 308 (Miss. 1992) (applying Mississippi law in dissolution of partnership that
owned Louisiana property but was characterized as "Mississippi partnership" on basis of
parties' agreement supplemented by general choice of law principles); Engel v. Ernst, 724
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case, a Texas court applied Alaska law on the enforceability of a waiver of
fiduciary disclosure duties despite the facts that the agreement was predominately negotiated, drafted, and executed in Texas and that the partnership

involved several Texas companies

68

Any question about whether courts will enforce contractual choice of

law clauses is being eliminated by statutes that provide for enforcement of
choice of law clauses in commercial agreements, 9 by RUPA, which
clarifies that the default rules on choice of law are subject to contrary
agreement,270 and by LLC,2' LLP, 272 and limited partnership2; statutes that

explicitly provide for registration of foreign entities and for application of
these entities' formation state law. As a result of enforcement of contractual choice of law, the parties can choose to be governed by the broad

Delaware opt-out provisions discussed above.274 In general, the combination of the Delaware statute and the expansion of enforcement of contractual
choice of law suggests that truly mandatory fiduciary duties are virtually a
dead issue. 5
P.2d 215, 216-18 (Nev. 1986) (holding that agreement governing accounting firm headquartered in Colorado that provided for application of Colorado law controlled interpretation of
provision on amounts due from retiring partner under agreement to pay fees that firm would
have earned from partnership clients that withdrawing partner serviced during two years
following withdrawal; reasoning that only Nevada's "strong public policy" may prevent
enforcement of choice of law clause; and concluding that lower court erred in finding such
policy because agreement did not eliminate competition, defendant could and did join new
firm, and firm had legitimate interest in protecting its client base and providing for liquidated
damages). But see Intercontinental Leasing v. Anderson, 410 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1969)
(applying joint and several liability under Kansas law rather than joint liability under Minnesota law despite Minnesota choice of law clause when contract was made and performed in
Kansas). For a more detailed discussion of enforcement of contractual choice of law, see
Larry E. Ribstein, ChoosingLaw by Contract, 18 J.CORP. L. 245, 261-66 (1993).
268. See Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1298 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1993); supra text
accompanying notes 198-200 (discussing Burglin).
269. See 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, § 1.04(C), at 1:72-:75.
270. See RUPA § 103 (not including choice of law in exclusive list of provisions that
cannot be waived in partnership agreement); 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22,
§ 1.04(d), at 1:75-:77.

271.

See

LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANIES 13-1 to 13-33 (1994 & Supp. 1997).

272. ALAN A. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT Ch. 6 (1995).
273. See REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AT § 901, 6A U.L.A. 254 (1995); 3
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, § 12.25(b), at 12:267-12:269.
274. See supra Part Im.D.
275. As discussed below in Part IIm.E.4, the parties could choose to be governed by
mandatory rules. However, as explained below, the parties would be contracting for binding
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2. Choice of FiduciaryStatus

The parties may choose the standard form that will provide the default
rules for their relationsilp, including whether these rules will be those of
a nonfiduciary relationship. For example, several cases hold that parties
who were in a debtor-creditor rather than a partnership relationship did not
owe fiduciary duties. 6 One might argue that creditors do not need fiduciary duties because of their specific rights to repayment of their debts with
interest.'

However, this general reasoning could be extended to any

situation in which the parties substitute other constraints for fiduciary
duties.27 Moreover, this reasoning does not explain why fiduciary duties
are not owed by one who contracts at arm's length to provide services to
279 or to one who chooses to be an assignee rather than a partner,'
the fitn
or why one might be able to avoid the full force of fiduciary remedies by
organizing a-partner as a corporation or other limited liability entity. 1 The
fiduciary duties rather than being subjected to fiduciary duties despite a contrary provision
in their contract.
276. See Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635, 646-47
(D.N.J. 1990) (noting that fiduciary principles should not be applied to arm's length debtorcreditor relationship in absence of partnership).
277. For a leading case denying fiduciary duties to creditors of corporations, see Katz
v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
278. See supra Part I.C.
279. See Bernard Weinraub, Analysis: Behind Sony Ouster, One Excess Too Many,
N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 7, 1995, at D1 (discussing arm's length deal between Peter Guber and
Sony Studios that allowed Guber to "selectively pluck film projects nurtured by Columbia
and Tristar executives and hand their production over to his own company, Mandalay
Entertainment").
280. See Bauer v. Blomfield Company/Holden Joint Venture, 849 P.2d 1365, 1367
(Alaska 1993) (holding that partners owe no duty to assignee to act in good faith, so
assignee could not question partners' decision to pay large commission to copartner, which
stopped income payments to assignee). Similarly, one who withdraws as a partner but
continues to receive payments from the firm is a mere assignee who is not owed continuing
fiduciary duties. See Hoffman Elec., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 800 F. Supp. 1279, 128485 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that general partner had no fiduciary duty to former limited
partners in dissolved limited partnership); Bane v. Ferguson, 707 F. Supp. 988, 991-92
(N.D. Mll.) (holding that continuing partners had no fiduciary duty liability to retired partner
for dissolution of firm that caused cessation of retirement benefits), aft'd, 890 F.2d 11 (7th
Cir. 1989); Finkelstein v. Security Properties, Inc., 888 P.2d 161, 167 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that ongoing partners who continue firm after dissolution probably have no
fiduciary duty to withdrawn partners to refrain from self-dealing, because dissociated
partner's share is fixed at time of withdrawal and therefore is unaffected by any subsequent
conduct).
281. For cases holding that fiduciary duties are owed by incorporated partners rather
than their controlling managers or shareholders, see Maywalt v. Parker& Parsley Petroleum
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assignee example should be particularly puzzling for anticontractarians
because an assignee, like her owner-assignor, is a residual claimant and yet
is even more vulnerable than an owner to partners' misdealing because she
lacks any management role in the partnership. Nor can the assignee necessarily rely on the assignor-partner to exercise her rights on behalf of the
assignee because the assignor may lack any incentive to do so. Of course;
the assignee can attempt to contract with her assignor or with the other
partners for specific protection, such as the assignor's promise to monitor
the firm and pursue fiduciary remedies when appropriate. But this begs the
question why the assignee is not legally entitled to such protection. Thus,
these cases are not easily expfained by generalities about when fiduciary
duties are appropriate. Rather, they demonstrate judicial recognition of the
principle that the contracting parties themselves are best able to decide
when fiduciary duties fit their relationship.
3. Choice of Form
The parties may choose from a menu of business forms offered by
each state, including corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability
companies, in addition to partnerships. Some of these statutes may have
more explicit waiver provisions than the general partnership statute. For
example, the Delaware provisions discussed above are only in the Delaware limited partnership and limited liability company statutes. It may be
that, given the proliferation of unincorporated business forms, states will
design their general partnership statutes for the simplest firms and other
statutes for more sophisticated firms that customize their agreements.' In
that event, states might provide somewhat stricter waiver rules for general
partnerships than for LLCs and similar firms.
4. Contractingfor Mandatory Rules
The parties' ability to choose the applicable law, form, or relationship
might have the surprising implication of supporting the enforcement of
"mandatory" fiduciary duty rules. A statutory antiwaiver rule is not necessarily inconsistent with the contractarian position as long as there is no
Co., 808 F. Supp. 1037, 1058-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying Texas and Pennsylvania law),

and Sturm v. Goss, 368 S.E.2d 399, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). Some cases have, however, imposed liability directly on owners in this situation on a variety of theories, including
veil-piercing, agency, or direct control. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22,

§ 6.07, at 6:68.
282.
283.

See supra Part mI.D.
See supra Part ll.G.3.
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impediment to organizing the business relationship under different default
rules or adopting a customized contract.3 Such a rule would permit states
to protect the most vulnerable relationships and at the same time let firms

contract for binding fiduciary duties that could not be changed by a subsequent amendment of the contract.s If, however, courts or legislatures
widen the effect of the antiwaiver rule by, for example, applying it even to
firms that are formed under foreign-state statutes or under other standard

forms, or by holding that certain types of relationships necessarily are
partnerships that are subject to the rule even if they are not designated as

partnerships, then this is an anticontractarian position that is subject to the
same criticisms as those directed in this Article against antiwaiver rules.'
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that fiduciary duties are not now

mandatory in any unincorporated business forms.
F. A PositiveAnalysis of the Uniform Laws
This Part has shown that the case law provides overwhelming support

for enforcement of fiduciary waivers. Nevertheless, RUPA and the
ULLCAW include significant limitations on fiduciary duty waivers. RUPA
provides that the partners may not:
(3)eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b)(3), but:

284. There may be such an impediment if, for example, it is more costly for a firm to
obtain certain business features under a statute that permits fiduciary duty waiver than under
a statute that does not.
285. The ability to agree to binding rules is an important contractual value that is lost
when legislatures change the rules and apply the changes to existing partnerships. See Larry
E. Ribstein, Changing Statutory Forms, 1 J. SM. Bus. L. (forthcoming 1997) (available on
the Internet at: <http:llmason.gmu.edu/-lribstei/index.htm). The extent to which legislatures can and do change rules is a function of legislative control over business associations
through both mandatory rules and restrictions on choice of law.
286. Similar considerations would apply to proposals by commentators to allow contracting, but only by selecting from a limited menu proposed by the commentators. See
Coffee, Mandatory/EnablingBalance, supra note 6, at 1664-76 (proposing to permit parties
to adopt "brand name" alternatives to mandatory rules); Vestal, Error,supra note 4, at 578
n.238 (proposals to permit opt-in to particular type of partnership); Weidner, supra note
4, at 107 (suggesting that partnership should be reserved for informal relationships of
highly interdependent). One anticontractarian makes clear her hostility to contracting
through choice of form. See Dickerson, supra note 87, at 400 (criticizing breakdown of
mandatory fiduciary duties that is heralded by new availability of more contractual forms
such as LLC).
287. ULLCA § 103(b)(2)-(4). These provisions correspond closely to the RUPA provisions and therefore will not be discussed separately.
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(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure
of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise
would violate the duty of loyalty;
(4) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 404(c) or

603(b)(3);
(5) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section
404(d), but the partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by
which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.'
The precise meaning of these vague and contradictory provisions is
open to question. Some commentators assert that these provisions prevent
only complete elimination of fiduciary duties. 9 But the language is susceptible to broader interpretations that are inconsistent not only with the policy
considerations discussed in Parts I and II, but also with the case law discussed in this Part. The restriction of duty of loyalty waivers to "specific
types or categories of activities" could be interpreted to require identification of specific conduct, such as acquisition of property, rather than merely
a type of wrong, such as self-dealing. This would invalidate the agreement
in Singer v. Singer,2' which provided that "[e]ach partner shall be free to
enter into business and other transactions for his or her own separate individual account, even though such business or other transaction may be in
conflict with and/or competition with the business of the partnership. "291
There is also no case law authority justifying judicial scrutiny of the "reasonableness" of fiduciary duty waivers similar to the RUPA limitation of
duty of care waivers. And requiring the parties to identify good faith
"standards" that are not "manifestly unreasonable" is not only hopelessly
vague but also inconsistent with the concept of good faith discussed in this
Article.' 2
288. RUPA § 103(b)(3)-(5). ULLCA Section 103(b)C2)-(4) corresponds closely to these
provisions and therefore will not be discussed separately.
289. See Vestal, Response, supra note 4, at 64; Weidner, supra note 4, at 93 (showing
how RUPA Section 103 could be interpreted even to permit the broad waiver in Singer v.
Singer, discussed supra text accompanying note 173).
290. 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
291. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 768 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); see supra text
accompanying note 173 (discussing Singer). It would also invalidate the agreement in
Dremco, discussed supra notes 177-78.

292.

As discussed in supra Part III.B, good faith is a mechanism of contract interpreta-
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IV. Concluding Remarks
Fiduciary duties should be broadly waivable in partnerships and other
unincorporated firms. Because the costs and benefits of fiduciary duties
vary from firm to firm, these duties must be varied to suit the particular
relationship. The parties themselves are in a far better position than courts
to determine precisely what level of duties should apply to their relationship. Anticontractarians' arguments against enforcing fiduciary duty
waivers are deeply flawed and overbroad. The appropriate rule is the one
set forth in the Delaware limited partnership and LLC statutes:293 the parties
should be able to alter default duties in their agreements as long as they are
held to good faith compliance with their contracts. A close look at the case
law shows that this is, in fact, the approach courts now apply.
This Article has broader lessons concerning the importance of deeper
analysis of the sometimes vague area of fiduciary duties. Normative
analysis should focus on specific problems that may be caused by permitting
waivers rather than making broad and conclusory statements about inefficiency and injustice. A concern for norms and morality does not make
analysis unnecessary. It is also time that the commentators drew conclusions only from close examination of large numbers of cases rather than
relying on sporadic dicta. The recent literature on fiduciary duty waivers
in partnerships has been dominated by academics who have sought to
impose their own unsupported views on controversies in which they have
no stake. It is time that a more lawyer-like attention to logic and facts
reclaimed the debate over this issue.

tion. Properly understood in this way, it is hard to see how the parties can waive the good
faith obligation at all. It follows that RUPA Section 404 probably represents an alternative
and incorrect view of good faith as a standard of conduct that is independent of the contract.

293. See supraPart II.D.

